Political accountability under moral hazard

Viewing the relationship between politicians and voters as a principal–agent interaction afflicted by moral hazard, we examine how political careers are shaped by the incentives that voters provide incumbents to work in the public interest. When moral hazard binds, the optimal way for voters to hold...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:American journal of political science 2024-04
Main Authors: Acharya, Avidit, Lipnowski, Elliot, Ramos, João
Format: Article
Language:English
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-40d3061374d482d5dd5470e5a64505058da36c1735e680639d1222da0bbd30803
container_end_page
container_issue
container_start_page
container_title American journal of political science
container_volume
creator Acharya, Avidit
Lipnowski, Elliot
Ramos, João
description Viewing the relationship between politicians and voters as a principal–agent interaction afflicted by moral hazard, we examine how political careers are shaped by the incentives that voters provide incumbents to work in the public interest. When moral hazard binds, the optimal way for voters to hold politicians accountable is to provide re‐election incentives that evolve dynamically over their careers in office. Under these incentives, first‐term politicians are among the most electorally vulnerable and the hardest‐working; politician effort rises with electoral vulnerability; electoral security increases following good performance and decreases following bad performance; and both effort and electoral vulnerability tend to decline with tenure. In extensions, we study limited voter commitment, voluntary retirement from politics, and adverse selection.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/ajps.12860
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>crossref</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1111_ajps_12860</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>10_1111_ajps_12860</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-40d3061374d482d5dd5470e5a64505058da36c1735e680639d1222da0bbd30803</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotj09LAzEQxYMouFYvfoI9K1snfzc5StEqFPSg5zCbSXHLtluS7aF-elN15jC8N7wHP8ZuOcx5mQfc7POcC2vgjFVcK2i0g_acVQBONNpqecmuct5A0crJit2_j0M_9QGHGkMYD7sJu744x_qwo5jq7ZjK6wu_MdE1u1jjkOPN_52xz-enj8VLs3pbvi4eV03gDqZGAUkwXLaKlBWkibRqIWo0SkNZSyhN4K3U0Vgw0hEXQhBC15WgBTljd3-9IY05p7j2-9RvMR09B3_C9CdM_4spfwAYzEQr</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Political accountability under moral hazard</title><source>Wiley</source><creator>Acharya, Avidit ; Lipnowski, Elliot ; Ramos, João</creator><creatorcontrib>Acharya, Avidit ; Lipnowski, Elliot ; Ramos, João</creatorcontrib><description>Viewing the relationship between politicians and voters as a principal–agent interaction afflicted by moral hazard, we examine how political careers are shaped by the incentives that voters provide incumbents to work in the public interest. When moral hazard binds, the optimal way for voters to hold politicians accountable is to provide re‐election incentives that evolve dynamically over their careers in office. Under these incentives, first‐term politicians are among the most electorally vulnerable and the hardest‐working; politician effort rises with electoral vulnerability; electoral security increases following good performance and decreases following bad performance; and both effort and electoral vulnerability tend to decline with tenure. In extensions, we study limited voter commitment, voluntary retirement from politics, and adverse selection.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0092-5853</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1540-5907</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12860</identifier><language>eng</language><ispartof>American journal of political science, 2024-04</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-40d3061374d482d5dd5470e5a64505058da36c1735e680639d1222da0bbd30803</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Acharya, Avidit</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lipnowski, Elliot</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ramos, João</creatorcontrib><title>Political accountability under moral hazard</title><title>American journal of political science</title><description>Viewing the relationship between politicians and voters as a principal–agent interaction afflicted by moral hazard, we examine how political careers are shaped by the incentives that voters provide incumbents to work in the public interest. When moral hazard binds, the optimal way for voters to hold politicians accountable is to provide re‐election incentives that evolve dynamically over their careers in office. Under these incentives, first‐term politicians are among the most electorally vulnerable and the hardest‐working; politician effort rises with electoral vulnerability; electoral security increases following good performance and decreases following bad performance; and both effort and electoral vulnerability tend to decline with tenure. In extensions, we study limited voter commitment, voluntary retirement from politics, and adverse selection.</description><issn>0092-5853</issn><issn>1540-5907</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNotj09LAzEQxYMouFYvfoI9K1snfzc5StEqFPSg5zCbSXHLtluS7aF-elN15jC8N7wHP8ZuOcx5mQfc7POcC2vgjFVcK2i0g_acVQBONNpqecmuct5A0crJit2_j0M_9QGHGkMYD7sJu744x_qwo5jq7ZjK6wu_MdE1u1jjkOPN_52xz-enj8VLs3pbvi4eV03gDqZGAUkwXLaKlBWkibRqIWo0SkNZSyhN4K3U0Vgw0hEXQhBC15WgBTljd3-9IY05p7j2-9RvMR09B3_C9CdM_4spfwAYzEQr</recordid><startdate>20240403</startdate><enddate>20240403</enddate><creator>Acharya, Avidit</creator><creator>Lipnowski, Elliot</creator><creator>Ramos, João</creator><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20240403</creationdate><title>Political accountability under moral hazard</title><author>Acharya, Avidit ; Lipnowski, Elliot ; Ramos, João</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-40d3061374d482d5dd5470e5a64505058da36c1735e680639d1222da0bbd30803</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Acharya, Avidit</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lipnowski, Elliot</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ramos, João</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Acharya, Avidit</au><au>Lipnowski, Elliot</au><au>Ramos, João</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Political accountability under moral hazard</atitle><jtitle>American journal of political science</jtitle><date>2024-04-03</date><risdate>2024</risdate><issn>0092-5853</issn><eissn>1540-5907</eissn><abstract>Viewing the relationship between politicians and voters as a principal–agent interaction afflicted by moral hazard, we examine how political careers are shaped by the incentives that voters provide incumbents to work in the public interest. When moral hazard binds, the optimal way for voters to hold politicians accountable is to provide re‐election incentives that evolve dynamically over their careers in office. Under these incentives, first‐term politicians are among the most electorally vulnerable and the hardest‐working; politician effort rises with electoral vulnerability; electoral security increases following good performance and decreases following bad performance; and both effort and electoral vulnerability tend to decline with tenure. In extensions, we study limited voter commitment, voluntary retirement from politics, and adverse selection.</abstract><doi>10.1111/ajps.12860</doi></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0092-5853
ispartof American journal of political science, 2024-04
issn 0092-5853
1540-5907
language eng
recordid cdi_crossref_primary_10_1111_ajps_12860
source Wiley
title Political accountability under moral hazard
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-28T21%3A40%3A33IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-crossref&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Political%20accountability%20under%20moral%20hazard&rft.jtitle=American%20journal%20of%20political%20science&rft.au=Acharya,%20Avidit&rft.date=2024-04-03&rft.issn=0092-5853&rft.eissn=1540-5907&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/ajps.12860&rft_dat=%3Ccrossref%3E10_1111_ajps_12860%3C/crossref%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-40d3061374d482d5dd5470e5a64505058da36c1735e680639d1222da0bbd30803%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true