ALL THE (MANY, MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical issues 2014-10, Vol.24 (1), p.24-38
Main Authors: Bjerring, Jens Christian, Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
conceptual bifurcation
extended beliefs
extended cognition
extended knowledge
extended mind thesis
knowledge
pluralism about belief
pluralism about knowledge
reliabilism
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Summary:In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.
ISSN:1533-6077
1758-2237
DOI:10.1111/phis.12024