Thinking Disagreement

In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the ch...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theoria (Lund, Sweden) Sweden), 2021-12, Vol.87 (6), p.1562-1584
Main Authors: Verdejo, Víctor M., Donato‐Rodríguez, Xavier
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Disagreement
intension
noncotenability
rationality
understanding
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Summary:In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the challenge that nourishes the alternative referential view and suggest, through examples, that (i) only intensional disagreement is apt to adequately accommodate basic rationality constraints on disagreement, and (ii) it can meet the aforementioned challenge insofar as we discriminate between noncotenability affecting one's concepts, intensionally conceived, and noncotenability affecting merely one's particular understanding of those concepts. We conclude that intensional disagreement is our best choice for an account of disagreement at the level of thought.
ISSN:0040-5825
1755-2567
DOI:10.1111/theo.12364