Are the Realist Bundle Theorists Committed to the Principle of Constituent Identity?

• Published in: KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 2024-01, Vol.37 (2), p.89-103
• Main Author: Bielińska, Marta Emilia
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: bundle theories; constituent ontology; the principle of constituent identity; the principle of identity of indiscernibles
• ISSN: 2750-977X; 2750-977X
• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2023-0002

One of the key questions in the contemporary analytic ontology concerns the relation between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) and the Bundle Theory (BT). The majority of authors believe that BT implies PII. Therefore, it is widely believed that the world violating PII presented by Max Black (1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” 61 (242): 153–64) is also devastating for BT. However, this has been questioned by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004. “The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars.” 64 (1): 72–81), who formulated an interpretation of BT with . Recently Robert (2019. “Can the Realist Bundle Theory Account for the Numerical Difference between Qualitavely Non-discernible Concrete Particulars?” Theorema 38 (1): 25–39) argued that this version of BT is not a constituent ontology and, therefore, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution comes at a price of excluding bundle theory from the domain of constituent ontologies, and, in this sense, it fails. I question Robert’s point by claiming that his account of constituent ontologies is too demanding. In particular, I show that the instance version of BT is compatible with the constrains defining constituent ontologies in general, and therefore Rodriguez-Pereyra’s argument is correct.