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Nedelsky and Kelsen criticize the notion of subjective rights. While Nedelsky does so on the basis of a relational theory of rights founded on the Hegelian intersubjective recognition, Kelsen rejects Hegel’s theory of rights because property, the paradigmatic subjective right, appears to be constitu...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Anuario filosófico 2018-09, p.19-45
Main Author: Cristi, Renato
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Nedelsky and Kelsen criticize the notion of subjective rights. While Nedelsky does so on the basis of a relational theory of rights founded on the Hegelian intersubjective recognition, Kelsen rejects Hegel’s theory of rights because property, the paradigmatic subjective right, appears to be constituted prior to intersubjectve recognition. This paper probes into Hegel’s conception of property to elucidate the root of the divergence between Nedelsky and Kelsen. Pierson v. Post is examined as an illustration of that divergence.
ISSN:0066-5215
2173-6111
DOI:10.15581/009.40.29270