Cooperation v. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business

This paper incorporates the notion of rivalry into current oligopoly models. Particular attention is placed on the specification of the firm interaction parameter. The empirical work demonstrates that rivalry is an important phenomenon in US manufacturing industries. Specifically, the findings sugge...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economica (London) 1986-08, Vol.53 (211), p.351-363
Main Authors: Kwoka, John E., Ravenscraft, David J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coefficients
Consumer goods industries
Food industries
Industrial economics
Industrial market
Industrial sectors
Industry
Market share
Oligopolies
Rivalry
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c215t-96e9df2df901ab9e87964e5232cf757c0180e49ca47e5f51c12891a0081f80f83
cites
container_end_page 363
container_issue 211
container_start_page 351
container_title Economica (London)
container_volume 53
creator Kwoka, John E.
Ravenscraft, David J.
description This paper incorporates the notion of rivalry into current oligopoly models. Particular attention is placed on the specification of the firm interaction parameter. The empirical work demonstrates that rivalry is an important phenomenon in US manufacturing industries. Specifically, the findings suggest that a larger market share raises a firm's own margin. A larger leader lowers follower margins in high-scale industries, but has little effect where scale economies are not important. In addition, larger second-ranked firms can significantly lower leaders' margins.
doi_str_mv 10.2307/2554139
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_2307_2554139</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>2554139</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>2554139</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c215t-96e9df2df901ab9e87964e5232cf757c0180e49ca47e5f51c12891a0081f80f83</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1j0tLAzEYRYMoOFbxL2QhuEr98pokLgQdfMGIIroe0jSRlDopyViYf-9Iu_Vu7l0cLhyEzinMGQd1xaQUlJsDVFFRawKcy0NUAVBOQDB1jE5KWcEUyVSFbpqUNj7bIaYeb-f4PW7tOo_X-C1H50mTyoBfbP6KfcGLEbex9zgFfPdTplXKKToKdl382b5n6PPh_qN5Iu3r43Nz2xLHqByIqb1ZBrYMBqhdGK-VqYWXjDMXlFQOqAYvjLNCeRkkdZRpQy2ApkFD0HyGLne_LqdSsg_dJsdvm8eOQven3e21J_JiR67KkPK_2C9fXlL-</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Cooperation v. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business</title><source>EconLit s plnými texty</source><source>Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】</source><source>JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection</source><creator>Kwoka, John E. ; Ravenscraft, David J.</creator><creatorcontrib>Kwoka, John E. ; Ravenscraft, David J.</creatorcontrib><description>This paper incorporates the notion of rivalry into current oligopoly models. Particular attention is placed on the specification of the firm interaction parameter. The empirical work demonstrates that rivalry is an important phenomenon in US manufacturing industries. Specifically, the findings suggest that a larger market share raises a firm's own margin. A larger leader lowers follower margins in high-scale industries, but has little effect where scale economies are not important. In addition, larger second-ranked firms can significantly lower leaders' margins.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0013-0427</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1468-0335</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2307/2554139</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London School of Economics and Political Science</publisher><subject>Coefficients ; Consumer goods industries ; Food industries ; Industrial economics ; Industrial market ; Industrial sectors ; Industry ; Market share ; Oligopolies ; Rivalry</subject><ispartof>Economica (London), 1986-08, Vol.53 (211), p.351-363</ispartof><rights>Copyright The London School of Economics and Political Science</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c215t-96e9df2df901ab9e87964e5232cf757c0180e49ca47e5f51c12891a0081f80f83</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2554139$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/2554139$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,58238,58471</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kwoka, John E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ravenscraft, David J.</creatorcontrib><title>Cooperation v. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business</title><title>Economica (London)</title><description>This paper incorporates the notion of rivalry into current oligopoly models. Particular attention is placed on the specification of the firm interaction parameter. The empirical work demonstrates that rivalry is an important phenomenon in US manufacturing industries. Specifically, the findings suggest that a larger market share raises a firm's own margin. A larger leader lowers follower margins in high-scale industries, but has little effect where scale economies are not important. In addition, larger second-ranked firms can significantly lower leaders' margins.</description><subject>Coefficients</subject><subject>Consumer goods industries</subject><subject>Food industries</subject><subject>Industrial economics</subject><subject>Industrial market</subject><subject>Industrial sectors</subject><subject>Industry</subject><subject>Market share</subject><subject>Oligopolies</subject><subject>Rivalry</subject><issn>0013-0427</issn><issn>1468-0335</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1986</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp1j0tLAzEYRYMoOFbxL2QhuEr98pokLgQdfMGIIroe0jSRlDopyViYf-9Iu_Vu7l0cLhyEzinMGQd1xaQUlJsDVFFRawKcy0NUAVBOQDB1jE5KWcEUyVSFbpqUNj7bIaYeb-f4PW7tOo_X-C1H50mTyoBfbP6KfcGLEbex9zgFfPdTplXKKToKdl382b5n6PPh_qN5Iu3r43Nz2xLHqByIqb1ZBrYMBqhdGK-VqYWXjDMXlFQOqAYvjLNCeRkkdZRpQy2ApkFD0HyGLne_LqdSsg_dJsdvm8eOQven3e21J_JiR67KkPK_2C9fXlL-</recordid><startdate>19860801</startdate><enddate>19860801</enddate><creator>Kwoka, John E.</creator><creator>Ravenscraft, David J.</creator><general>London School of Economics and Political Science</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19860801</creationdate><title>Cooperation v. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business</title><author>Kwoka, John E. ; Ravenscraft, David J.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c215t-96e9df2df901ab9e87964e5232cf757c0180e49ca47e5f51c12891a0081f80f83</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1986</creationdate><topic>Coefficients</topic><topic>Consumer goods industries</topic><topic>Food industries</topic><topic>Industrial economics</topic><topic>Industrial market</topic><topic>Industrial sectors</topic><topic>Industry</topic><topic>Market share</topic><topic>Oligopolies</topic><topic>Rivalry</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kwoka, John E.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ravenscraft, David J.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Economica (London)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kwoka, John E.</au><au>Ravenscraft, David J.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Cooperation v. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business</atitle><jtitle>Economica (London)</jtitle><date>1986-08-01</date><risdate>1986</risdate><volume>53</volume><issue>211</issue><spage>351</spage><epage>363</epage><pages>351-363</pages><issn>0013-0427</issn><eissn>1468-0335</eissn><abstract>This paper incorporates the notion of rivalry into current oligopoly models. Particular attention is placed on the specification of the firm interaction parameter. The empirical work demonstrates that rivalry is an important phenomenon in US manufacturing industries. Specifically, the findings suggest that a larger market share raises a firm's own margin. A larger leader lowers follower margins in high-scale industries, but has little effect where scale economies are not important. In addition, larger second-ranked firms can significantly lower leaders' margins.</abstract><pub>London School of Economics and Political Science</pub><doi>10.2307/2554139</doi><tpages>13</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0013-0427
ispartof Economica (London), 1986-08, Vol.53 (211), p.351-363
issn 0013-0427
1468-0335
language eng
recordid cdi_crossref_primary_10_2307_2554139
source EconLit s plnými texty; Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection
subjects Coefficients
Consumer goods industries
Food industries
Industrial economics
Industrial market
Industrial sectors
Industry
Market share
Oligopolies
Rivalry
title Cooperation v. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-04T10%3A29%3A53IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Cooperation%20v.%20Rivalry:%20Price-Cost%20Margins%20by%20Line%20of%20Business&rft.jtitle=Economica%20(London)&rft.au=Kwoka,%20John%20E.&rft.date=1986-08-01&rft.volume=53&rft.issue=211&rft.spage=351&rft.epage=363&rft.pages=351-363&rft.issn=0013-0427&rft.eissn=1468-0335&rft_id=info:doi/10.2307/2554139&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_cross%3E2554139%3C/jstor_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c215t-96e9df2df901ab9e87964e5232cf757c0180e49ca47e5f51c12891a0081f80f83%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=2554139&rfr_iscdi=true