Disclosure and Dynamic Risk Sharing with a Large Shareholder

We study the effects of disclosure in a dynamic market with imperfect competition. The supply of an asset is determined by a large shareholder with price impact, who trades slowly to diversify away from concentrated ownership. Small investors provide capital and thus risk-bearing capacity to the mar...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Accounting review 2024-10, p.1-32
Main Authors: Cianciaruso, Davide, Qiu, Lin, Xue, Wenjie
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:We study the effects of disclosure in a dynamic market with imperfect competition. The supply of an asset is determined by a large shareholder with price impact, who trades slowly to diversify away from concentrated ownership. Small investors provide capital and thus risk-bearing capacity to the market. Although it is well known that disclosure impedes risk sharing by shifting risk before future trading opportunities, we show that disclosure, at the same time, can enhance risk sharing by promoting more trades. Resolving this tradeoff, an interior level of disclosure quality maximizes the small investors’ surplus as well as the total surplus, but minimizes the large shareholder’s surplus. Further, efficient disclosure policies feature increasing quality over time. JEL Classifications: D80; E21; G12; L13; M41.
ISSN:0001-4826
1558-7967
DOI:10.2308/TAR-2022-0159