SAVIGNY'S THEORY OF CHOICE-OF-LAW AS A PRINCIPLE OF 'VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION'

This article offers an innovative understanding of Friedrich Carl von Savigny's comprehensive choice-of-law theory. This theory has been generally misunderstood in academic literature in that it has most often been perceived as a kind of blind reference to the mysterious 'universal seat fo...

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Published in:The University of Toronto law journal 2014-01, Vol.64 (1), p.106-151
Main Author: Peari, Sagi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Civil law
Conflict of laws
Conflicts of laws
Contract law
Family law
Historians
Jurisdiction
Law
Presuppositions
Privacy rights
Property law
Rule of law
Tort law
Torts
Unjust enrichment
von Savigny, Friedrich Carl (1779-1861)
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description This article offers an innovative understanding of Friedrich Carl von Savigny's comprehensive choice-of-law theory. This theory has been generally misunderstood in academic literature in that it has most often been perceived as a kind of blind reference to the mysterious 'universal seat formula.' In contrast to this commonly perceived view, it will be argued that Savigny's choice-of-law theory is fundamentally grounded in the single organizing principle of 'voluntary submission' as a reflection of the person's choice. Furthermore, it will be argued that the proposed understanding of Savigny's choice-of-law theory is not detached from the reality of American judicial practice but, in fact, reflects it. In particular, it will be suggested that Savigny's approach provides the key to grasping the theoretical underpinnings of the most central element of the popular Second Restatement – the most-significant-relationship principle.
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source Nexis UK; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Project Muse:Jisc Collections:Project MUSE Journals Agreement 2024:Premium Collection; PAIS Index
subjects Civil law
Conflict of laws
Conflicts of laws
Contract law
Family law
Historians
Jurisdiction
Law
Presuppositions
Privacy rights
Property law
Rule of law
Tort law
Torts
Unjust enrichment
von Savigny, Friedrich Carl (1779-1861)
title SAVIGNY'S THEORY OF CHOICE-OF-LAW AS A PRINCIPLE OF 'VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION'
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