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Response to Bernard Reginster, Jorah Dannenberg, and Andrew Huddleston
This is a response to Bernard Reginster's, Jorah Dannenberg's, and Andrew Huddleston's comments published in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47.3, on Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I address the main points raised in their critiques: Dannenberg's concerns about whether I...
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Published in: | Journal of Nietzsche studies 2016-11, Vol.47 (3), p.457-478 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | This is a response to Bernard Reginster's, Jorah Dannenberg's, and Andrew Huddleston's comments published in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47.3, on Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I address the main points raised in their critiques: Dannenberg's concerns about whether I have adequately characterized nihilism and his argument that Nietzschean constitutivism would be of no help to the nihilist; Reginster's argument that constitutivism offers no interpretive advantage over internalism and subjectivism, his contention that it is a mistake to see all drives as aiming at expression, and his arguments against my claim that all actions aim at power; and Huddleston's critiques of the will to power thesis and objections to the constitutivist project. I argue that these objections and concerns can be answered. |
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ISSN: | 0968-8005 1538-4594 |
DOI: | 10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0457 |