Response to Bernard Reginster, Jorah Dannenberg, and Andrew Huddleston

This is a response to Bernard Reginster's, Jorah Dannenberg's, and Andrew Huddleston's comments published in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47.3, on Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I address the main points raised in their critiques: Dannenberg's concerns about whether I...

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Published in:Journal of Nietzsche studies 2016-11, Vol.47 (3), p.457-478
Main Author: Katsafanas, Paul
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Humans
Hunger
Internalism
Medical treatment
Motivational internalism
Nietzschean philosophy
Nihilism
Normativity
Subjectivism
Will to power
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creator Katsafanas, Paul
description This is a response to Bernard Reginster's, Jorah Dannenberg's, and Andrew Huddleston's comments published in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47.3, on Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I address the main points raised in their critiques: Dannenberg's concerns about whether I have adequately characterized nihilism and his argument that Nietzschean constitutivism would be of no help to the nihilist; Reginster's argument that constitutivism offers no interpretive advantage over internalism and subjectivism, his contention that it is a mistake to see all drives as aiming at expression, and his arguments against my claim that all actions aim at power; and Huddleston's critiques of the will to power thesis and objections to the constitutivist project. I argue that these objections and concerns can be answered.
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source JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection【Remote access available】; Project Muse:Jisc Collections:Project MUSE Journals Agreement 2024:Premium Collection
subjects Humans
Hunger
Internalism
Medical treatment
Motivational internalism
Nietzschean philosophy
Nihilism
Normativity
Subjectivism
Will to power
title Response to Bernard Reginster, Jorah Dannenberg, and Andrew Huddleston
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