Against Focusing on the Internal Conditions of Nietzschean Greatness

After reconstructing three arguments for Nietzsche’s descriptive analysis of the self as complex, this article clarifies some of greatness’s psychological conditions. It then offers three arguments for why we should not focus on these internal conditions when seeking to verify or to achieve greatnes...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Nietzsche studies 2023-03, Vol.54 (1), p.76-101
Main Author: Mollison, James A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
drives
General Interest
greatness
introspection
Philosophy
self
self-consciousness
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:After reconstructing three arguments for Nietzsche’s descriptive analysis of the self as complex, this article clarifies some of greatness’s psychological conditions. It then offers three arguments for why we should not focus on these internal conditions when seeking to verify or to achieve greatness. First, Nietzsche’s descriptive analysis of the self renders introspection too coarse-grained and error-prone to verify the subtle type of unity required for greatness. Second, Nietzsche associates introspective appraisal of one’s psyche with a moral project that weakens and represses the drives, such that inquiry into whether greatness’s internal conditions are satisfied typically speaks against their realization. Finally, the actions characteristic of Nietzsche’s great individuals prohibit introspective preoccupation with oneself. These arguments suggest that we should attend to outwardly directed accomplishments, rather than psychology, when appraising the greatness of others and seeking to become great ourselves.
ISSN:0968-8005
1538-4594
DOI:10.5325/jnietstud.54.1.0076