Stability and voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2004-10, Vol.23 (2), p.229-247
Main Authors: Berga, Dolors, Bergantiños, Gustavo, Massó, Jordi, Neme, Alejandro
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ambivalence
Binary relations
Candidates
Eleccions
Elections
Grants
Induction assumption
Mathematical functions
Political candidates
Preferences
Rational Choice
Research grants
Social choice
Society
Sovereignty
Studies
Vot
Voter behavior
Voting
Voting Behavior
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Summary:We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà et al. 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6