LA ELECCIÓN DE LOS MIEMBROS DEL CONSEJO GENERAL DEL PODER JUDICIAL. UNA PROPUESTA DE CONSEJO MÁS INTEGRADOR E INDEPENDIENTE

The perception of the Judicial Council is, throughout its existence, too often associated to partisan or corporative interests. This has caused the image of the judiciary to suffer as a whole. One way to avoid dependence on outside interests is the procedure to appoint its members. Until now, three...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Teoría y realidad constitucional 2013-01 (31), p.299-321
Main Author: Cristóbal, Rosario Serra
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Subjects:
Judicial elections
Judiciary
Justice
Power
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The perception of the Judicial Council is, throughout its existence, too often associated to partisan or corporative interests. This has caused the image of the judiciary to suffer as a whole. One way to avoid dependence on outside interests is the procedure to appoint its members. Until now, three systems were tested, but none proved to be effective for the intended aims. This essay formulates a new appointment system proposal for the Council's members, involving the direct participation of judges and the legislature. It pursues the following objectives: to observe the democratic principle, and to facilitate and promote the participation of all judges and magistrates in the election of its governing body -thus ensuring a plural and inclusive body-. Additionally, other measures are formulated in order to limit outside influences and pressure on the Council, to promote the election of its members based primarily on merit and ability, and to steer the Council back to its strict mandate of defending judicial independence and Justice interests. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:1139-5583
2174-8950