Stackelberg game-based optimal electricity trading method for distribution networks with small-micro industrial parks

• Published in: Frontiers in energy research 2024-02, Vol.12
• Main Authors: Chen, Liyuan, Ye, Qingquan, Wu, Xuguang, Chen, Yundi, Wang, Wanhuan
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: distribution network; electricity market; multiple stakeholders; small-micro industrial parks; Stackelberg game
• ISSN: 2296-598X; 2296-598X
• DOI: 10.3389/fenrg.2024.1348823

In order to improve the operating benefits of the distribution network (DN) and reduce the energy consumption costs of small-micro industrial parks (SMIPs), a two-layer optimal electricity trading method for DN with SMIPs is proposed. First, based on the Stackelberg game, a multi-objective two-layer optimal trading model for DN and SMIP is established. In the upper layer, the DN agent is regarded as the leader, and a trading model is established with the goal of maximizing the profits of agents. In the lower layer, an energy optimization model is proposed for the SMIP operators, which are regarded as the followers, with the goal of minimizing the operating costs. According to the buying and selling electricity prices at the upper and lower layers, a dynamic pricing strategy is formulated. The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker condition (KKT) is introduced to transform the two-layer model into a single-layer model, and based on linear transformations, the model is further converted into a mixed-integer linear programming model. The transformations aim to address the non-linear issues arising from multivariable coupling between the upper and lower-layer trading models. The simulation results show that the trading strategy proposed in this paper can effectively increase the profit of DNs while reducing the operating costs of SMIPs and can provide a reference for decision-making in the electricity market (EM) with the participation of SMIP.