Cooperation and Coordination in Threshold Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players

In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments ei, productivities pi, and rewards ri. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes, and multiple cooperat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games 2023-12, Vol.14 (6), p.76
Main Authors: An, Xinmiao, Dong, Yali, Wang, Xiaomin, Zhang, Boyu
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
asymmetric game
Asymmetry
Cooperation
Coordination
Endowment
Endowments
Equilibrium
Game theory
Games
Heterogeneity
Inequality
Players
Productivity
Public good
threshold public goods game
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Summary:In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments ei, productivities pi, and rewards ri. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes, and multiple cooperative NEs, in which the group’s collective contribution equals the threshold. We then study how multiple dimensions of inequality influence people’s cooperation and coordination. We show that heterogeneity in eipi can promote cooperation in the sense that the existence condition of the defective NE becomes stricter. Furthermore, players with higher eipi are likely to contribute more at a cooperative NE in terms of collective contribution (i.e., absolute contribution multiplied by productivity).
ISSN:2073-4336
2073-4336
DOI:10.3390/g14060076