Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

The paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berg...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Open computer science 2021-01, Vol.11 (1), p.127-134
Main Authors: Kudryavtsev, Konstantin, Malkov, Ustav
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Berge equilibrium
non-cooperative game
three-person game
weak Berge equilibrium
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Summary:The paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.
ISSN:2299-1093
2299-1093
DOI:10.1515/comp-2020-0210