Competition and Financial Stability in the European Listed Banks

• Published in: SAGE open 2021-07, Vol.11 (3)
• Main Authors: López-Penabad, Maria Celia, Iglesias-Casal, Ana, Neto, José Fernando Silva
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Banking industry; Banks; Competition
• ISSN: 2158-2440; 2158-2440
• DOI: 10.1177/21582440211032645

The analysis of the relationship between bank competition and financial stability remains a controversial issue and widely discussed in the academic and political community. Using a sample of 117 listed banks in 16 European countries for the years 2011 to 2018, the article explores the impact of market power, measured by the Lerner index, on the bank stability, measured by distance-to-default and Z score. Our results show that for the overall sample, higher market power in banking decreases the risky behavior of banks, confirming the “competition-fragility” view. We do not find any support for a U-shaped relationship between competition and bank risk-taking. However, our findings differ from previous studies pointing out that the relationship between bank competition and risk-taking is differentiated depending on whether the bank is based in a country with a more stable banking system or a less stable one. In countries with a less financially stable banking system, increased competition leads to increased bank risk-taking. In countries with a more stable banking system, market power seems not to influence banks’ financial stability. Public policies must guarantee banking competition but limiting excessive bank risk-taking, especially in countries with less financially sound banking systems. The consolidation of European banking can be a key element for achieving these policies.