Safe Food Supply Chain as Health Network: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Behavior Strategy for Quality Investment

• Published in: Inquiry (Chicago) 2024-01, Vol.61, p.469580241244728-469580241244728
• Main Authors: Wu, Linhai, Ling, Zhiyuan, Zhang, Jingxiang, Dai, Xiaoting, Chen, Xiujuan
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Food Industry - economics; Food Safety; Food Supply - economics; Game Theory; Humans; Investments; Strategic Knowledge Networking in and around Health Organizations: Contexts, Dynamics, and Interdisciplinary Explorations
• ISSN: 0046-9580; 1945-7243
• DOI: 10.1177/00469580241244728

There is a natural relation between human health and the quality of their food and drinks, and elevating the quality input level of food production for all enterprises within the food supply chain system forms the foundation for preventing various potential food safety risks that may be encountered. Unlike the previous research on quality investment of food production by enterprises, this paper probes into the evolutionary routes of the behavior strategy selection of subjects in the food supply chain and the preconditions for the equilibrium points of the social co-governance system. It takes the approach of establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model of food suppliers, food manufacturers and consumers on the basis of the social co-governance framework, in view of the above, this paper focuses on the influence of the reputation mechanism and the market contracts among supply chain subjects on the selection of a behavior strategy for quality investment by enterprises under the condition of lawful regulation by government. The results show that every subject selects their own behavior strategy on the basis of the balance of their respective interests. The net disbursement incurred by enterprises for quality investment and the costs of participation in governance by consumers constitute the dominant factors that influence both enterprises' selection of a behavior strategy and the level of social co-governance. Compared with the increase in economic punishment imposed on suppliers for production of risky food raw materials, it is more efficient to control food safety risks by lowering the costs of quality investment by suppliers. Accordingly, this paper proposes advice on policy in an attempt to provide inspiration for preventing and controlling food safety risks.