Low-Carbon Construction in China’s Construction Industry from the Perspective of Evolutionary Games

Industrialization and increased energy use are leading to a greater influence of environmental and climate challenges on human existence and progress. China’s emissions in 2023 totaled 12.6 gigatons, representing 35% of global emissions, establishing it as the top carbon emitter globally. Combined w...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Buildings (Basel) 2024-06, Vol.14 (6), p.1593
Main Authors: Yang, Xiaozhuang, Liu, Keyun
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Carbon
Carbon content
Climate change
Construction companies
Construction industry
Decision making
dual carbon
Emissions
Emitters
Energy consumption
environmental organizations
Environmental protection
Evolution
Game theory
Government regulations
Greenhouse gases
Hypotheses
Innovations
Laws, regulations and rules
mixed strategy
numerical simulation
Pollution
Regulation
Simulation analysis
Subsidies
Support systems
Systems stability
three-way game
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Summary:Industrialization and increased energy use are leading to a greater influence of environmental and climate challenges on human existence and progress. China’s emissions in 2023 totaled 12.6 gigatons, representing 35% of global emissions, establishing it as the top carbon emitter globally. Combined with China’s industrial structure, it is essential to investigate carbon reduction in the building sector due to its significant contribution to carbon emissions. This study introduces a third-party organization into the relationship between stakeholders, based on traditional government regulation. It constructs a three-party dynamic evolution model involving the government, environmental protection organization, and construction enterprise. The study analyzes the evolution process of the three-party strategy selection using evolutionary game theory. We analyze the elements influencing decision-making for the three parties through simulation analysis and provide appropriate recommendations. The study’s findings indicate that low-carbon construction in China’s construction sector is an intricate system involving several stakeholders, each guided by their own interests when determining their behavioral methods. Government penalties and financial subsidies can influence construction enterprises to adopt low-carbon production practices to some degree, but excessive rewards and punishments may not support system stability.
ISSN:2075-5309
2075-5309
DOI:10.3390/buildings14061593