HOW ARMED GROUPS SURVIVE IN FAILED STATES: EVIDENCE FROM LIBYA

Armed groups generally emerge in failed states that do not have a monopoly on the use of force. These states with more than one power center can be characterized as anarchic systems. In such an environment, a shift in the balance of power in favor of an armed group poses an existential threat to the...

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Published in:Trames (Tallinn) 2024-01, Vol.28 (2), p.119-136
Main Author: Polat, F
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Alliances
anarchy
armed groups
Balance of power
Behavior
Causality
Civil war
Colonies & territories
Competition
failed states
libya
Sovereignty
strategies for survival
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description Armed groups generally emerge in failed states that do not have a monopoly on the use of force. These states with more than one power center can be characterized as anarchic systems. In such an environment, a shift in the balance of power in favor of an armed group poses an existential threat to the security of others. This study examines how armed groups respond to shifts in the balance of power to maintain their security in an anarchic system. By examining the case of Libya, the study argues that armed groups tend to employ strategies for deterring the aggressor to restore the balance of power.
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source Sociology Collection (OCUL); Publicly Available Content Database; Social Science Premium Collection; ProQuest One Literature
subjects Alliances
anarchy
armed groups
Balance of power
Behavior
Causality
Civil war
Colonies & territories
Competition
failed states
libya
Sovereignty
strategies for survival
title HOW ARMED GROUPS SURVIVE IN FAILED STATES: EVIDENCE FROM LIBYA
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