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Bidder Network Community Division and Collusion Suspicion Analysis in Chinese Construction Projects
Bidder collusion seriously undermines the fair competition of the construction project market, and effective identification of collusion behaviors is of vital importance to the implementation of proactive regulation and supervision. In this paper, the data of construction project bidders from 2011 t...
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Published in: | Advances in civil engineering 2020, Vol.2020 (2020), p.1-14 |
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description | Bidder collusion seriously undermines the fair competition of the construction project market, and effective identification of collusion behaviors is of vital importance to the implementation of proactive regulation and supervision. In this paper, the data of construction project bidders from 2011 to 2018 are selected in Shaanxi Province, China, and a bidder network of construction projects is constructed. The collusion suspicion of bidders is analyzed from the macro-, meso-, and microlevels. The results show that the bidder network has features as small world at macrolevels, and it is easy for bidders to involve in collusion. The network community formed by construction, supervision, and survey and design bidding enterprises is analyzed at the mesolevel, and the collusion of supervision enterprises is found to have the highest suspicion At the microlevel, the characteristic value judgment and community division are adopted to analyze the collusion suspicion, which is divided into high, medium, and low according to the possibility. Through a comparison with the actual data, it is found that the method proposed in this paper can effectively identify the collusion behavior of construction project bidders. This paper proposes red, yellow, and green warning mechanism and formulates hierarchical accurate management preparedness, which can provide some suggestions to help prevent bidders from colluding. |
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In this paper, the data of construction project bidders from 2011 to 2018 are selected in Shaanxi Province, China, and a bidder network of construction projects is constructed. The collusion suspicion of bidders is analyzed from the macro-, meso-, and microlevels. The results show that the bidder network has features as small world at macrolevels, and it is easy for bidders to involve in collusion. The network community formed by construction, supervision, and survey and design bidding enterprises is analyzed at the mesolevel, and the collusion of supervision enterprises is found to have the highest suspicion At the microlevel, the characteristic value judgment and community division are adopted to analyze the collusion suspicion, which is divided into high, medium, and low according to the possibility. Through a comparison with the actual data, it is found that the method proposed in this paper can effectively identify the collusion behavior of construction project bidders. This paper proposes red, yellow, and green warning mechanism and formulates hierarchical accurate management preparedness, which can provide some suggestions to help prevent bidders from colluding.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1687-8086</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1687-8094</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1155/2020/6612848</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cairo, Egypt: Hindawi Publishing Corporation</publisher><subject>Algorithms ; Behavior ; Bids ; Cartels ; Civil engineering ; Competition ; Construction industry ; Corruption ; Developing countries ; Division ; Economic development ; Game theory ; GDP ; Gross Domestic Product ; Industrialized nations ; LDCs ; Participation ; Project engineering ; Supervision</subject><ispartof>Advances in civil engineering, 2020, Vol.2020 (2020), p.1-14</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2020 Jiwei Zhu et al.</rights><rights>Copyright © 2020 Jiwei Zhu et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 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This paper proposes red, yellow, and green warning mechanism and formulates hierarchical accurate management preparedness, which can provide some suggestions to help prevent bidders from colluding.</description><subject>Algorithms</subject><subject>Behavior</subject><subject>Bids</subject><subject>Cartels</subject><subject>Civil engineering</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Construction industry</subject><subject>Corruption</subject><subject>Developing countries</subject><subject>Division</subject><subject>Economic development</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>GDP</subject><subject>Gross Domestic Product</subject><subject>Industrialized nations</subject><subject>LDCs</subject><subject>Participation</subject><subject>Project engineering</subject><subject>Supervision</subject><issn>1687-8086</issn><issn>1687-8094</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>COVID</sourceid><sourceid>PIMPY</sourceid><sourceid>DOA</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkctL7DAUxotcQVF3rqXg0juad9Old3yCqKD7kCYnmrHTzE1ah_nvTa3o0rM5D358h3O-ojjE6BRjzs8IIuhMCEwkk1vFLhaymklUsz_ftRQ7xUFKvkGMVUQSgncL889bC7G8h34d4ls5D8vl0Pl-U174d5986Erd2Txu2-GzexrSypuxOu90u0k-lb4r56--gwSZ61IfB9OPwGMMCzB92i-2nW4THHzlveL56vJ5fjO7e7i-nZ_fzQxnvJ81UgOxiCIEDTWGikY6zqk01FLTOCpx1bhKOE0a5jjKUUmNCa4cEVYgulfcTrI26IVaRb_UcaOC9upzEOKL0rH3pgVVM3CWg9aAHNM11cQAYVzYsTXcZq3jSWsVw_8BUq8WYYj54KQIqwSTuEZ1pv5OlIkhpQjueytGajRFjaaoL1MyfjLh-VlWr_1v9NFEQ2bA6R8aE0Lqmn4AtP-Wxg</recordid><startdate>2020</startdate><enddate>2020</enddate><creator>Wang, Jiangrui</creator><creator>Li, Liang</creator><creator>Wang, Bing</creator><creator>Zhu, Jiwei</creator><general>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</general><general>Hindawi</general><general>Hindawi Limited</general><scope>ADJCN</scope><scope>AHFXO</scope><scope>RHU</scope><scope>RHW</scope><scope>RHX</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AEUYN</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>COVID</scope><scope>CWDGH</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>DOA</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7928-4197</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0964-0640</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1022-916X</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0050-2759</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>2020</creationdate><title>Bidder Network Community Division and Collusion Suspicion Analysis in Chinese Construction Projects</title><author>Wang, Jiangrui ; Li, Liang ; Wang, Bing ; Zhu, Jiwei</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c545t-b8ae2d0300eb3cc36b8f5538c3d3cbf3817bf76fa2b4f5000078a1217f26d603</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Algorithms</topic><topic>Behavior</topic><topic>Bids</topic><topic>Cartels</topic><topic>Civil engineering</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Construction industry</topic><topic>Corruption</topic><topic>Developing countries</topic><topic>Division</topic><topic>Economic development</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>GDP</topic><topic>Gross Domestic Product</topic><topic>Industrialized nations</topic><topic>LDCs</topic><topic>Participation</topic><topic>Project engineering</topic><topic>Supervision</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Wang, Jiangrui</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Li, Liang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Bing</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhu, Jiwei</creatorcontrib><collection>الدوريات العلمية والإحصائية - e-Marefa Academic and Statistical Periodicals</collection><collection>معرفة - المحتوى العربي الأكاديمي المتكامل - e-Marefa Academic Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Complete</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Subscription Journals</collection><collection>Hindawi Publishing Open Access Journals</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Sustainability</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>Coronavirus Research Database</collection><collection>Middle East & Africa Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering collection</collection><collection>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>Advances in civil engineering</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Wang, Jiangrui</au><au>Li, Liang</au><au>Wang, Bing</au><au>Zhu, Jiwei</au><au>Bedon, Chiara</au><au>Chiara Bedon</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Bidder Network Community Division and Collusion Suspicion Analysis in Chinese Construction Projects</atitle><jtitle>Advances in civil engineering</jtitle><date>2020</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>2020</volume><issue>2020</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>14</epage><pages>1-14</pages><issn>1687-8086</issn><eissn>1687-8094</eissn><abstract>Bidder collusion seriously undermines the fair competition of the construction project market, and effective identification of collusion behaviors is of vital importance to the implementation of proactive regulation and supervision. In this paper, the data of construction project bidders from 2011 to 2018 are selected in Shaanxi Province, China, and a bidder network of construction projects is constructed. The collusion suspicion of bidders is analyzed from the macro-, meso-, and microlevels. The results show that the bidder network has features as small world at macrolevels, and it is easy for bidders to involve in collusion. The network community formed by construction, supervision, and survey and design bidding enterprises is analyzed at the mesolevel, and the collusion of supervision enterprises is found to have the highest suspicion At the microlevel, the characteristic value judgment and community division are adopted to analyze the collusion suspicion, which is divided into high, medium, and low according to the possibility. Through a comparison with the actual data, it is found that the method proposed in this paper can effectively identify the collusion behavior of construction project bidders. This paper proposes red, yellow, and green warning mechanism and formulates hierarchical accurate management preparedness, which can provide some suggestions to help prevent bidders from colluding.</abstract><cop>Cairo, Egypt</cop><pub>Hindawi Publishing Corporation</pub><doi>10.1155/2020/6612848</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7928-4197</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0964-0640</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1022-916X</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0050-2759</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Algorithms Behavior Bids Cartels Civil engineering Competition Construction industry Corruption Developing countries Division Economic development Game theory GDP Gross Domestic Product Industrialized nations LDCs Participation Project engineering Supervision |
title | Bidder Network Community Division and Collusion Suspicion Analysis in Chinese Construction Projects |
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