Interval-Valued Fuzzy Cooperative Games Based on the Least Square Excess and Its Application to the Profit Allocation of the Road Freight Coalition

This paper is mainly committed to constructing a new model for solving interval-valued fuzzy cooperative games based on the least square excess. We propose the interval-valued least square excess solution according to the solution concept of the least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleol...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Symmetry (Basel) 2018-12, Vol.10 (12), p.709
Main Authors: Zhao, Wen-Jian, Liu, Jia-Cai
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
cooperative game
Efficiency
Exact solutions
fuzzy game
Game theory
Games
green logistics
Income distribution
interval
Least squares
Logistics
Mathematical programming
road freight coalition
Supply chains
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This paper is mainly committed to constructing a new model for solving interval-valued fuzzy cooperative games based on the least square excess. We propose the interval-valued least square excess solution according to the solution concept of the least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus for solving crisp cooperative games. In order to obtain the corresponding optimal analytical solution, one mathematic programming model is constructed. The least square excess solution can be used to determine plays’ payoffs directly. Considering the fuzziness and uncertainty existing in the process of the road freight coalition, we establish the interval-valued fuzzy utility function of the road freight coalition that can properly reflect the real situation in view of the green logistics. The illustratively calculated results show that the least square excess solution proposed in this paper is effectual and ascendant, and satisfied many important and useful properties of cooperative games, such as symmetry and uniqueness. As for the problems of interval-valued cooperative games, the model proposed in this paper can be applied appropriately to obtain the players’ interval-valued payoffs.
ISSN:2073-8994
2073-8994
DOI:10.3390/sym10120709