Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility

In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of infor...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theoria (Madrid, Spain) Spain), 2008-01, Vol.23 (1(61)), p.35-44
Main Author: Origgi, Gloria
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Conversation
Democratic authority
Epistemic justification
Ethical epistemology
Information relevance
Monographic Section: Testimony and Trust in Contemporary Epistemology
Morality
Pragmatics
Public opinion
Relevant alternatives
trust, testimonial knowledge, communication, pragmatics of trust, epistemic responsibility
Truth
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Description
Summary:In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators.
ISSN:0495-4548
2171-679X
DOI:10.1387/theoria.4