Equilibrium Selection in Hawk–Dove Games

We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk–dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure method...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games 2024-02, Vol.15 (1), p.2
Main Authors: Blázquez de Paz, Mario, Koptyug, Nikita
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Auctions
Demand analysis
Duopoly
Equilibrium
equilibrium selection
Game theory
hawk–dove games
Impact analysis
Inequality
Leadership
Prices
Product differentiation
Production capacity
quantal response method
robustness to strategic uncertainty method
Tracing
tracing procedure method
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk–dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and the quantal response method of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) select the same equilibrium. When the demand is high, the tracing procedure method does not select any equilibrium, but the quantal response method still selects the same equilibrium as when the demand is low or intermediate. The robustness to strategic uncertainty method of Andersson, Argenton and Weibull (2014) selects two of the multiple equilibria irrespective of the demand size. We also analyze the impact of an increase in the minimum bid allowed by the auctioneer in the equilibrium selection.
ISSN:2073-4336
2073-4336
DOI:10.3390/g15010002