The Polarization of the Coupling Strength of Interdependent Networks Stimulates Cooperation

We introduce a mixed network coupling mechanism and study its effects on how cooperation evolves in interdependent networks. This mechanism allows some players (conservative-driven) to establish a fixed-strength coupling, while other players (radical-driven) adjust their coupling strength through th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) Switzerland), 2022-05, Vol.24 (5), p.694
Main Authors: Liu, Jinzhuo, Peng, Yunchen, Zhu, Peican, Yu, Yong
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
coevolution
Conservatism
Cooperation
Coupling
Evolution
evolutionary game theory
Game theory
interdependent network
Light
Monte Carlo simulation
Players
Polarization
Political asylum
Population
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Summary:We introduce a mixed network coupling mechanism and study its effects on how cooperation evolves in interdependent networks. This mechanism allows some players (conservative-driven) to establish a fixed-strength coupling, while other players (radical-driven) adjust their coupling strength through the evolution of strategy. By means of numerical simulation, a hump-like relationship between the level of cooperation and conservative participant density is revealed. Interestingly, interspecies interactions stimulate polarization of the coupling strength of radical-driven players, promoting cooperation between two types of players. We thus demonstrate that a simple mixed network coupling mechanism substantially expands the scope of cooperation among structured populations.
ISSN:1099-4300
1099-4300
DOI:10.3390/e24050694