A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

In this study, a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication...

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Published in:Applied sciences 2019-02, Vol.9 (4), p.666
Main Authors: Melhem, Mutaz, Kish, Laszlo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Communication
ground loop vulnerability
Information theory
Internet of Things
Kirchhoff law
KLJN key exchange
Leaking of information
Noise
Optical fibers
passive attack
Physics
Power flow
Quantum computing
Resistors
Social security
Thermal noise
unconditional security
Values
Visibility
Wireless networks
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container_title Applied sciences
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description In this study, a new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic voltage-source in the loop. Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, or between different units within an instrument, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI). Our present study investigates the DC ground loop situation when no AC or EMI effects are present. Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison-based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leaks) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated and proposed defense methods against the attack are shown.
doi_str_mv 10.3390/app9040666
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subjects Communication
ground loop vulnerability
Information theory
Internet of Things
Kirchhoff law
KLJN key exchange
Leaking of information
Noise
Optical fibers
passive attack
Physics
Power flow
Quantum computing
Resistors
Social security
Thermal noise
unconditional security
Values
Visibility
Wireless networks
title A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System
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