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State control, access to capital and firm performance
We study the effect of state control on capital allocation and investment in China, where the government screens prospective stock issuers. We find that state firms are more likely to obtain government approval to conduct seasoned equity offerings than non-state firms. Further, non-state firms exhib...
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| Published in: | China journal of accounting research 2012-06, Vol.5 (2), p.101-125 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c463t-965fb78dbe993608cfbf9f96b9cc4be32b370e15e381fa9153a7001a9389b7563 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c463t-965fb78dbe993608cfbf9f96b9cc4be32b370e15e381fa9153a7001a9389b7563 |
| container_end_page | 125 |
| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 101 |
| container_title | China journal of accounting research |
| container_volume | 5 |
| creator | Li, Oliver Zhen Su, Xijia Yang, Zhifeng |
| description | We study the effect of state control on capital allocation and investment in China, where the government screens prospective stock issuers. We find that state firms are more likely to obtain government approval to conduct seasoned equity offerings than non-state firms. Further, non-state firms exhibit greater sensitivities of subsequent investment and stock performance to regulatory decisions on stock issuances than state firms. Our work suggests that state control of capital access distorts resource allocation and impedes the growth of non-state firms. We also provide robust evidence that financial constraints cause underinvestment. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.cjar.2012.05.001 |
| format | article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1755-3091 |
| ispartof | China journal of accounting research, 2012-06, Vol.5 (2), p.101-125 |
| issn | 1755-3091 2214-1421 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_f4cf1ec094914f699368011c846457ee |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Access Access to capital capital control Firm Firm growth growth Regula Regulation State State control |
| title | State control, access to capital and firm performance |
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