Systems Theory, Unity of Effort, and Military Leadership

Joint Doctrine, explicitly, and Army Doctrine, implicitly, recommend that military commanders and staffs exercise systems thinking in operational planning and execution. However, current Military Doctrine fails to fully explicate and apply a complex systems perspective. The question arises: Does any...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Livingood, Lisa J
Format: Report
Language:English
Subjects:
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE
AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT
ARGHANDAB TRANSFORMATION
ARMY DOCTRINE
CAUSATION
CENTER OF GRAVITY
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
COOPERATION
Government and Political Science
GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN)
HELMAND PROVINCE(AFGHANISTAN)
IJC(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE JOINT COMMAND)
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
INTERVENTION
JOINT DOCTRINE
JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES
KANDAHAR CITY(AFGHANISTAN)
LEADERSHIP
LINKAGES
MENTAL MODELS
MILITARY COMMANDERS
MILITARY DOCTRINE
Military Forces and Organizations
MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
MILITARY LEADERSHIP
MILITARY PLANNING
NODES
OPERATION OMID PARTNER TEAMS
POLICE
RODRIGUEZ DAVID M
SOCIAL NETWORKS
STABILIZATION
SYSTEMS APPROACH
SYSTEMS THEORY
TEAMS(PERSONNEL)
THESES
Unconventional Warfare
UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS
UNITY OF EFFORT
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Summary:Joint Doctrine, explicitly, and Army Doctrine, implicitly, recommend that military commanders and staffs exercise systems thinking in operational planning and execution. However, current Military Doctrine fails to fully explicate and apply a complex systems perspective. The question arises: Does any senior military commander use complex systems theory to understand, describe, and intervene in the operational environment? To this end, I analyze two briefings and a set of command brief slides that then Lieutenant General David M. Rodriguez used to articulate his understanding and interventions in Afghanistan as the Commander of the International Security and Assistance Force Joint Command. I also analyze his Foreign Affairs article on Afghanistan, which was published soon after he left in July 2011. This analysis reveals that complex systems theory suffuses how Rodriguez visualized his mission to stabilize Afghanistan in cooperation with an international coalition of Unified Action partners. Also, I show how Rodriguez's understanding, descriptions, and interventions follow a systems approach characterized by complex stakeholder interactions, depicted by nodes and linkages. The implications of this research are significant for scholars, doctrine writers, and military leaders responsible for achieving national security objectives against hybrid threats and in cooperation with interagency, international, and host nation partners. The original document contains color images.