Loading…

Preventing supplier non-conformance: extending the agency theory perspective

PurposeThe supply chain management literature and agency theory suggest that preventing supplier non-conformance—a supplier's failure to conform to the requirements of the buyer—requires monitoring supplier behavior. However, case studies collected to explore how buyers monitored suppliers reve...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of operations & production management 2020-04, Vol.40 (3), p.315-340
Main Authors: Shevchenko, Anton, Pagell, Mark, Lévesque, Moren, Johnston, David
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143
container_end_page 340
container_issue 3
container_start_page 315
container_title International journal of operations & production management
container_volume 40
creator Shevchenko, Anton
Pagell, Mark
Lévesque, Moren
Johnston, David
description PurposeThe supply chain management literature and agency theory suggest that preventing supplier non-conformance—a supplier's failure to conform to the requirements of the buyer—requires monitoring supplier behavior. However, case studies collected to explore how buyers monitored suppliers revealed an unexpected empirical phenomenon. Some buyers believed they could prevent non-conformance by either trusting their suppliers or relying on a third party, without monitoring their behavior. The purpose of this article is to examine conditions when buyers should monitor supplier behavior to prevent non-conformance.Design/methodology/approachThis article employs a mixed-method design by formulating an agent-based simulation grounded in the case-study findings and agency theory to reconcile observed unexpected behaviors with scholarly suggestions.FindingsThe simulation results indicate that buyers facing severe consequences from non-conformance should opt to monitor supplier behavior. Sourcing from trusted suppliers should only be reserved for buyers that lack competence and have a small number of carefully selected suppliers. Moreover, buyers facing minor consequences from non-conformance should generally favor sourcing from trusted suppliers over monitoring their behavior. The results also suggest that having a third-party involved in monitoring suppliers is an effective path to preventing non-conformance.Originality/valueBy combining a simulation with qualitative case studies, this article examines whether buyers were making appropriate decisions, thereby offering contributions to theory and practice that would not have been possible using either methodological approach alone.
doi_str_mv 10.1108/IJOPM-08-2019-0601
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_emera</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_emerald_primary_10_1108_IJOPM-08-2019-0601</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2395171753</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNptkMtOwzAQRS0EEqXwA6wisTb4ET_CDlVQioraBawtx56UVK0T7LSif09C2SCxmru4Z0ZzELqm5JZSou9mL4vlKyYaM0ILTCShJ2hEldBYioKfohGheY65UOocXaS0JoQwTsUIzZcR9hC6OqyytGvbTQ0xC03ArglVE7c2OLjP4KuD4IdO9wGZXUFwhyE28ZC1EFMLrqv3cInOKrtJcPU7x-j96fFt8ozni-ls8jDHjkvZ4aokIi9ybpUQpS8EY0qCFjmXlFWOe6-0Bea9lmCVVIWstNCydLmuPCtpzsfo5ri3jc3nDlJn1s0uhv6kYbwQVPWf877Fji0Xm5QiVKaN9dbGg6HEDNbMjzXTh8GaGaz1ED1CsIVoN_5_5o9p_g1Ufm9O</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2395171753</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Preventing supplier non-conformance: extending the agency theory perspective</title><source>ABI/INFORM Collection</source><source>Emerald:Jisc Collections:Emerald Subject Collections HE and FE 2024-2026:Emerald Premier (reading list)</source><creator>Shevchenko, Anton ; Pagell, Mark ; Lévesque, Moren ; Johnston, David</creator><creatorcontrib>Shevchenko, Anton ; Pagell, Mark ; Lévesque, Moren ; Johnston, David</creatorcontrib><description>PurposeThe supply chain management literature and agency theory suggest that preventing supplier non-conformance—a supplier's failure to conform to the requirements of the buyer—requires monitoring supplier behavior. However, case studies collected to explore how buyers monitored suppliers revealed an unexpected empirical phenomenon. Some buyers believed they could prevent non-conformance by either trusting their suppliers or relying on a third party, without monitoring their behavior. The purpose of this article is to examine conditions when buyers should monitor supplier behavior to prevent non-conformance.Design/methodology/approachThis article employs a mixed-method design by formulating an agent-based simulation grounded in the case-study findings and agency theory to reconcile observed unexpected behaviors with scholarly suggestions.FindingsThe simulation results indicate that buyers facing severe consequences from non-conformance should opt to monitor supplier behavior. Sourcing from trusted suppliers should only be reserved for buyers that lack competence and have a small number of carefully selected suppliers. Moreover, buyers facing minor consequences from non-conformance should generally favor sourcing from trusted suppliers over monitoring their behavior. The results also suggest that having a third-party involved in monitoring suppliers is an effective path to preventing non-conformance.Originality/valueBy combining a simulation with qualitative case studies, this article examines whether buyers were making appropriate decisions, thereby offering contributions to theory and practice that would not have been possible using either methodological approach alone.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0144-3577</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1758-6593</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1108/IJOPM-08-2019-0601</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Bradford: Emerald Publishing Limited</publisher><subject>Agency theory ; Case studies ; Decision theory ; Mixed methods research ; Monitoring ; Product quality ; Purchasing ; Simulation ; Sourcing ; Stakeholders ; Suppliers ; Supply chain management ; Supply chains ; Theory</subject><ispartof>International journal of operations &amp; production management, 2020-04, Vol.40 (3), p.315-340</ispartof><rights>Emerald Publishing Limited</rights><rights>Emerald Publishing Limited 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-8960-8626</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/2395171753/fulltextPDF?pq-origsite=primo$$EPDF$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/2395171753?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,11688,27924,27925,36060,44363,74895</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Shevchenko, Anton</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pagell, Mark</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lévesque, Moren</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Johnston, David</creatorcontrib><title>Preventing supplier non-conformance: extending the agency theory perspective</title><title>International journal of operations &amp; production management</title><description>PurposeThe supply chain management literature and agency theory suggest that preventing supplier non-conformance—a supplier's failure to conform to the requirements of the buyer—requires monitoring supplier behavior. However, case studies collected to explore how buyers monitored suppliers revealed an unexpected empirical phenomenon. Some buyers believed they could prevent non-conformance by either trusting their suppliers or relying on a third party, without monitoring their behavior. The purpose of this article is to examine conditions when buyers should monitor supplier behavior to prevent non-conformance.Design/methodology/approachThis article employs a mixed-method design by formulating an agent-based simulation grounded in the case-study findings and agency theory to reconcile observed unexpected behaviors with scholarly suggestions.FindingsThe simulation results indicate that buyers facing severe consequences from non-conformance should opt to monitor supplier behavior. Sourcing from trusted suppliers should only be reserved for buyers that lack competence and have a small number of carefully selected suppliers. Moreover, buyers facing minor consequences from non-conformance should generally favor sourcing from trusted suppliers over monitoring their behavior. The results also suggest that having a third-party involved in monitoring suppliers is an effective path to preventing non-conformance.Originality/valueBy combining a simulation with qualitative case studies, this article examines whether buyers were making appropriate decisions, thereby offering contributions to theory and practice that would not have been possible using either methodological approach alone.</description><subject>Agency theory</subject><subject>Case studies</subject><subject>Decision theory</subject><subject>Mixed methods research</subject><subject>Monitoring</subject><subject>Product quality</subject><subject>Purchasing</subject><subject>Simulation</subject><subject>Sourcing</subject><subject>Stakeholders</subject><subject>Suppliers</subject><subject>Supply chain management</subject><subject>Supply chains</subject><subject>Theory</subject><issn>0144-3577</issn><issn>1758-6593</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>M0C</sourceid><recordid>eNptkMtOwzAQRS0EEqXwA6wisTb4ET_CDlVQioraBawtx56UVK0T7LSif09C2SCxmru4Z0ZzELqm5JZSou9mL4vlKyYaM0ILTCShJ2hEldBYioKfohGheY65UOocXaS0JoQwTsUIzZcR9hC6OqyytGvbTQ0xC03ArglVE7c2OLjP4KuD4IdO9wGZXUFwhyE28ZC1EFMLrqv3cInOKrtJcPU7x-j96fFt8ozni-ls8jDHjkvZ4aokIi9ybpUQpS8EY0qCFjmXlFWOe6-0Bea9lmCVVIWstNCydLmuPCtpzsfo5ri3jc3nDlJn1s0uhv6kYbwQVPWf877Fji0Xm5QiVKaN9dbGg6HEDNbMjzXTh8GaGaz1ED1CsIVoN_5_5o9p_g1Ufm9O</recordid><startdate>20200428</startdate><enddate>20200428</enddate><creator>Shevchenko, Anton</creator><creator>Pagell, Mark</creator><creator>Lévesque, Moren</creator><creator>Johnston, David</creator><general>Emerald Publishing Limited</general><general>Emerald Group Publishing Limited</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8960-8626</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20200428</creationdate><title>Preventing supplier non-conformance: extending the agency theory perspective</title><author>Shevchenko, Anton ; Pagell, Mark ; Lévesque, Moren ; Johnston, David</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Agency theory</topic><topic>Case studies</topic><topic>Decision theory</topic><topic>Mixed methods research</topic><topic>Monitoring</topic><topic>Product quality</topic><topic>Purchasing</topic><topic>Simulation</topic><topic>Sourcing</topic><topic>Stakeholders</topic><topic>Suppliers</topic><topic>Supply chain management</topic><topic>Supply chains</topic><topic>Theory</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Shevchenko, Anton</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pagell, Mark</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lévesque, Moren</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Johnston, David</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Global News &amp; ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>Mechanical &amp; Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>ABI-INFORM Complete</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science &amp; Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>DELNET Management Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>Health Management Database (Proquest)</collection><collection>ProQuest research library</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>International journal of operations &amp; production management</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Shevchenko, Anton</au><au>Pagell, Mark</au><au>Lévesque, Moren</au><au>Johnston, David</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Preventing supplier non-conformance: extending the agency theory perspective</atitle><jtitle>International journal of operations &amp; production management</jtitle><date>2020-04-28</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>40</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>315</spage><epage>340</epage><pages>315-340</pages><issn>0144-3577</issn><eissn>1758-6593</eissn><abstract>PurposeThe supply chain management literature and agency theory suggest that preventing supplier non-conformance—a supplier's failure to conform to the requirements of the buyer—requires monitoring supplier behavior. However, case studies collected to explore how buyers monitored suppliers revealed an unexpected empirical phenomenon. Some buyers believed they could prevent non-conformance by either trusting their suppliers or relying on a third party, without monitoring their behavior. The purpose of this article is to examine conditions when buyers should monitor supplier behavior to prevent non-conformance.Design/methodology/approachThis article employs a mixed-method design by formulating an agent-based simulation grounded in the case-study findings and agency theory to reconcile observed unexpected behaviors with scholarly suggestions.FindingsThe simulation results indicate that buyers facing severe consequences from non-conformance should opt to monitor supplier behavior. Sourcing from trusted suppliers should only be reserved for buyers that lack competence and have a small number of carefully selected suppliers. Moreover, buyers facing minor consequences from non-conformance should generally favor sourcing from trusted suppliers over monitoring their behavior. The results also suggest that having a third-party involved in monitoring suppliers is an effective path to preventing non-conformance.Originality/valueBy combining a simulation with qualitative case studies, this article examines whether buyers were making appropriate decisions, thereby offering contributions to theory and practice that would not have been possible using either methodological approach alone.</abstract><cop>Bradford</cop><pub>Emerald Publishing Limited</pub><doi>10.1108/IJOPM-08-2019-0601</doi><tpages>26</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8960-8626</orcidid></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0144-3577
ispartof International journal of operations & production management, 2020-04, Vol.40 (3), p.315-340
issn 0144-3577
1758-6593
language eng
recordid cdi_emerald_primary_10_1108_IJOPM-08-2019-0601
source ABI/INFORM Collection; Emerald:Jisc Collections:Emerald Subject Collections HE and FE 2024-2026:Emerald Premier (reading list)
subjects Agency theory
Case studies
Decision theory
Mixed methods research
Monitoring
Product quality
Purchasing
Simulation
Sourcing
Stakeholders
Suppliers
Supply chain management
Supply chains
Theory
title Preventing supplier non-conformance: extending the agency theory perspective
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-06T09%3A35%3A22IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_emera&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Preventing%20supplier%20non-conformance:%20extending%20the%20agency%20theory%20perspective&rft.jtitle=International%20journal%20of%20operations%20&%20production%20management&rft.au=Shevchenko,%20Anton&rft.date=2020-04-28&rft.volume=40&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=315&rft.epage=340&rft.pages=315-340&rft.issn=0144-3577&rft.eissn=1758-6593&rft_id=info:doi/10.1108/IJOPM-08-2019-0601&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_emera%3E2395171753%3C/proquest_emera%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c366t-fb054943a755bd952276e8543612fc3dd78ae2dd86ea76796f8586bc48fd2b143%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2395171753&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true