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Impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against mutual funds
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is any impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against the mutual funds. Design/methodology/approach The author studies if freshness of mutual fund holding information from public disclosures affects precisi...
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Published in: | Managerial finance 2017-01, Vol.43 (9), p.999-1015 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is any impact of reporting delays on profitability of front-running strategies against the mutual funds.
Design/methodology/approach
The author studies if freshness of mutual fund holding information from public disclosures affects precision of flow-based front-running strategies against the funds and if the allowed 60-day reporting delay is able to protect the funds from these front-running activities against them.
Findings
Assuming no reporting delay, the author finds that returns from hypothetical front-running strategies are significant, when these are based on the most recent holding information and are not significant, when based on relatively old holding information. Interestingly, these front-running returns appear to be mostly driven by anticipated forced buys by the mutual funds (rather than anticipated forced sales). The return from a front-running strategy long on anticipated forced buys is higher when it is based on relatively illiquid assets. The author also finds that return from a front-running strategy short on anticipated forced sales is significant, when it is based on illiquid assets from relatively old holding information.
Practical implications
Hence, it appears that the allowed 60-day reporting delay is able to protect most of the funds from front-running activities against them, except for the funds holding illiquid assets from anticipated forced sales motivated front-running activities against them.
Originality/value
The paper addresses an interesting question, which has not been studied before – if freshness of fund holding information helps the front-running strategies against the funds and if the allowed reporting delay is effective in protecting the funds from these activities. |
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ISSN: | 0307-4358 1758-7743 |
DOI: | 10.1108/MF-06-2016-0181 |