The fiscal compact and national ownership

The fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on deficit and debt have become the focus of many scholarly works in the past 15 years. The study of domestic fiscal rules, however, has remained a neglected part of research. The new Treaty on the EMU’s Stability, Cooperation and Governance (TSCG) m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Romanian journal of political science 2014-06, Vol.14 (1), p.87-115
Main Author: Benczes, István
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Bias
Budgets
Costs
Economic and Monetary Union
Economic development
Economic growth
European Commission
European Monetary Union
Eurozone
Fiscal policy
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
Media studies
Member states
Monetary unions
Ownership
Political economy
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Summary:The fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on deficit and debt have become the focus of many scholarly works in the past 15 years. The study of domestic fiscal rules, however, has remained a neglected part of research. The new Treaty on the EMU’s Stability, Cooperation and Governance (TSCG) makes the analysis of domestic fiscal rules highly relevant since the Treaty requires member states to adopt a balanced budget rule. By analysing domestic fiscal rules in EU member states on the one hand and the fiscal compact on the other hand, the paper intends to show that without a strong political commitment and national ownership, no fiscal rule can be effective enough. Therefore, the new TSCG should be strengthened in this particular aspect.
ISSN:1582-456X
2068-7613