Phenomenology, Ontology, Nihilism: Løgstrup, Levinas, and the Limits of Philosophical Anthropology

Despite recent interest in his work, little has been written about Løgstrup’s relation to phenomenology—what he thinks phenomenology is, how it informs his approach to ethics, and what he believes it can accomplish. Here I hope to stimulate further discussion of these matters. In this, consideration...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Monist 2020-01, Vol.103 (1), p.16-37
Main Author: Crowell, Steven
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ethics
Metaphysics
Nihilism
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Summary:Despite recent interest in his work, little has been written about Løgstrup’s relation to phenomenology—what he thinks phenomenology is, how it informs his approach to ethics, and what he believes it can accomplish. Here I hope to stimulate further discussion of these matters. In this, consideration of Levinas’s understanding of phenomenology will be useful. While sharing many of Løgstrup’s concerns, Levinas insists on a distinction between phenomenological ontology and “metaphysics,” one that Løgstrup tends to blur in support of his argument that “absolute nihilism is an impossibility.” After showing why this distinction matters, I will argue that Løgstrup’s goal is better achieved if we embrace Heidegger’s transcendental version of phenomenology rather than follow Løgstrup or Levinas, despite much that remains phenomenologically valuable in both.
ISSN:0026-9662
2153-3601
DOI:10.1093/monist/onz025