The Effects of Sacred Value Networks Within an Evolutionary, Adversarial Game

• Published in: Journal of statistical physics 2013-05, Vol.151 (3-4), p.673-688
• Main Authors: McCalla, Scott G., Short, Martin B., Brantingham, P. Jeffrey
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Mathematical and Computational Physics; Physical Chemistry; Physics; Physics and Astronomy; Quantum Physics; Statistical Physics and Dynamical Systems; Theoretical
• ISSN: 0022-4715; 1572-9613
• DOI: 10.1007/s10955-012-0678-4

The effects of personal relationships and shared ideologies on levels of crime and the formation of criminal coalitions are studied within the context of an adversarial, evolutionary game first introduced in Short et al. (Phys. Rev. E 82:066114, 2010 ). Here, we interpret these relationships as connections on a graph of N players. These connections are then used in a variety of ways to define each player’s “sacred value network”—groups of individuals that are subject to special consideration or treatment by that player. We explore the effects on the dynamics of the system that these networks introduce, through various forms of protection from both victimization and punishment. Under local protection, these networks introduce a new fixed point within the game dynamics, which we find through a continuum approximation of the discrete game. Under more complicated, extended protection, we numerically observe the emergence of criminal coalitions, or “gangs”. We also find that a high-crime steady state is much more frequent in the context of extended protection networks, in both the case of Erdős-Rényi and small world random graphs.