Reassessing the Legislative Veto: The Statutory President, Foreign Affairs, and Congressional Workarounds

Abstract A chief reason that the President is insufficiently constrained when exercising statutorily-delegated power, it is claimed, is the Supreme Court’s disallowance of legislative vetoes in its decision in INS v. Chadha, a claim that intensified during the Trump administration. This article chal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The journal of legal analysis 2021, Vol.13 (1), p.439-501
Main Author: Bradley, Curtis A
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Administrative discretion
Delegated legislation
Delegation of powers
Executive power
International relations
Judicial review of administrative acts
Laws, regulations and rules
Legislative veto
Separation of powers
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Summary:Abstract A chief reason that the President is insufficiently constrained when exercising statutorily-delegated power, it is claimed, is the Supreme Court’s disallowance of legislative vetoes in its decision in INS v. Chadha, a claim that intensified during the Trump administration. This article challenges this account, arguing that the availability of the legislative veto was less important before Chadha to congressional-executive relations than legal scholars commonly assume, and that, to the extent that the legislative veto was (or would have become) important for checking some exercises of statutorily-delegated authority, Congress has developed a host of effective workarounds in the years since Chadha.
ISSN:2161-7201
1946-5319
DOI:10.1093/jla/laab008