Gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership

This paper compares the impact of two equalization transfer schemes on regional budgetary choices: a gross equalization scheme, where ex-post transfers to regions are financed from federal tax revenues, and a net equalization scheme, where region-to-region ex-post transfers allocated by the federal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of urban economics 2010-09, Vol.68 (2), p.205-214
Main Authors: Breuillé, Marie-Laure, Madiès, Thierry, Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budgetary policy
Budgets
Comparative analysis
Current and capital public expenditures
Decentralization
Decentralized leadership
Decentralized leadership Fiscal federalism Gross and net equalization schemes Current and capital public expenditures
Economic policy
Economic theory
Economics and Finance
Expenditures
Fiscal federalism
Government spending
Gross and net equalization schemes
Humanities and Social Sciences
Local finance
Public expenditure
State court decisions
Studies
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Summary:This paper compares the impact of two equalization transfer schemes on regional budgetary choices: a gross equalization scheme, where ex-post transfers to regions are financed from federal tax revenues, and a net equalization scheme, where region-to-region ex-post transfers allocated by the federal government are self-financed. The net equalization scheme reduces ex-post federal intervention and should therefore be favored over the gross equalization scheme in order to reduce opportunistic regional behaviour. In addition, the two equalization schemes differently affect the composition of public expenditures. The gross equalization scheme generates an upward distortion of the amount of capital public expenditures whereas the net equalization scheme generates a downward distortion of the amount of current public expenditures compared to the optimum. A welfare analysis reveals that incentives to use a net equalization scheme are strengthened for a sufficiently high number of regions.
ISSN:0094-1190
1095-9068
DOI:10.1016/j.jue.2010.04.002