Corruption in public service delivery: An experimental analysis

• Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization 2009-10, Vol.72 (1), p.225-239
• Main Authors: Barr, Abigail, Lindelow, Magnus, Serneels, Pieter
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Bureaucracy; Case studies; Corruption; Corruption D730; Corruption Experiment; Ethiopia; Experiment; Experiments; Formal and Informal Sectors; Game theory; Games; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420; Impact analysis; Institutional Arrangements O170; Institutions; Monitoring; Nurses; Nursing; Public Administration; Public health; Public Sector Accounting and Audits H830; Public services; Quantitative Finance; Service delivery; Shadow Economy; Studies; Wages
• ISSN: 0167-2681; 1879-1751; 0167-2681
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.006

To improve our understanding of corruption in service delivery, we use a newly designed game that allows us to investigate the effects of the institutional environment on the behavior of service providers and their monitors. We focus on the effect of four different factors: whether monitors are accountable to the service recipients, the degree of observability of service providers’ effort, the providers’ wages and the providers’ professional norms. In accordance with theory, we find that service providers perform better when monitors are elected by service recipients and when their effort is more easily observed. However, there is only weak evidence that service providers perform better when paid more. Monitors are more vigilant when elected and when service providers are paid more. Playing the game with Ethiopian nursing students, we also find that those with greater exposure to the Ethiopian public health sector perform less well, either as provider or as monitor, when the experiment is framed as a public health provision scenario, suggesting that experience and norms affect behavior.