Quantity–quality management of a groundwater resource by a water agency

•We consider a dynamic game model between farmers and a water regulating agency (WA).•The model accounts for both quantity and quality of the groundwater.•Farmers optimize profits and WA aims at reaching desired quantity and quality levels.•We compare the regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios.•We sh...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Environmental science & policy 2014-12, Vol.44, p.201-214
Main Authors: Erdlenbruch, Katrin, Tidball, Mabel, Zaccour, Georges
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Animal, plant and microbial ecology
Applied ecology
Biological and medical sciences
Conservation, protection and management of environment and wildlife
Dynamic game
Environment
Environmental problems
Environmental Sciences
Farmers
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Groundwater management
Human ecology and demography
Pollution
Quantity–quality management
Regulation
Socio-ecological system
Sociology
Stackelberg game
Stocks
Tax policy
Water
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Summary:•We consider a dynamic game model between farmers and a water regulating agency (WA).•The model accounts for both quantity and quality of the groundwater.•Farmers optimize profits and WA aims at reaching desired quantity and quality levels.•We compare the regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios.•We show how WRA achieves its objectives using constant tax/subsidy over time. This paper constructs a dynamic game model to address the following groundwater management problem, where quantity and quality of the water are taken into account. A group of farmers overexploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A water agency wishes to regulate the farmers’ activity, in order to reach a minimum level of quantity and quality but is subject to a budget constraint and can only use regulatory policies that do not vary over time. The model takes into account the strategic interaction between farmers and the hierarchical relationship between the water agency and the farmers. Regulated and Laisser-Faire scenarios are compared. Results consist in a set of conditions under which constant policies can bring the groundwater resource back to the desired states. In an example, it is shown how this decision making tool could help define environmental tax policies.
ISSN:1462-9011
1873-6416
DOI:10.1016/j.envsci.2014.08.002