A model of ideological transmission with endogenous parental preferences

Under what conditions can a given trait, such as religion or language, be preserved in the long run? To answer this question I develop a dynamic framework of ideological transmission in families in which parents are biased towards children’s traits and socioeconomic activities are modeled in the sha...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of economic theory 2012-12, Vol.8 (4), p.381-403
Main Author: Ghidi, Paolo Melindi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Children & youth
D10
diversity
Economic theory
Economics and Finance
Humanities and Social Sciences
ideological transmission
J19
paternalistic preferences
Studies
taste for similarity
Z13
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Summary:Under what conditions can a given trait, such as religion or language, be preserved in the long run? To answer this question I develop a dynamic framework of ideological transmission in families in which parents are biased towards children’s traits and socioeconomic activities are modeled in the shape of a trust‐matching process. I model how children are educated to a specific ideological trait that later in life will influence the well‐being of the family. Compared to the existing literature, my model yields two new results. First, paternalistic preferences in children’s education at time t are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure the preservation of heterogeneity in the long‐run distribution of traits. Second, my model is able to reproduce historical events in which a reversal of parents’ evaluation of traits has been observed. Assuming myopic agents does not change the qualitative results of the model.
ISSN:1742-7355
1742-7363
DOI:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2012.00196.x