Improving side-channel attacks against pairing-based cryptography

Side-channel attacks are a serious threat against secret data involved in cryptographic calculations, as, for instance, pairing-based cryptography which is a promising tool for the IoT. We focus our work on correlation power analysis (CPA) attack against a pairing implementation. We improve a vertic...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of cryptographic engineering 2020-04, Vol.10 (1), p.1-16
Main Authors: Jauvart, Damien, El Mrabet, Nadia, Fournier, Jacques J. A., Goubin, Louis
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Circuits and Systems
Communications Engineering
Computer Communication Networks
Computer Science
Correlation analysis
Cryptography
Cryptography and Security
Cryptology
Data Structures and Information Theory
Embedded Systems
Multiplication
Networks
Operating Systems
Regular Paper
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Side-channel attacks are a serious threat against secret data involved in cryptographic calculations, as, for instance, pairing-based cryptography which is a promising tool for the IoT. We focus our work on correlation power analysis (CPA) attack against a pairing implementation. We improve a vertical side-channel analysis attack and propose the first horizontal attack against a pairing implementation. First, we present a characterization of the multiplication that allows us to reduce by a factor of ten the number of side-channel traces required in order to perform a CPA attack against an implementation of Ate pairing. Secondly, we successfully attack the same implementation with only one trace by using the first horizontal attack path against pairing-based cryptography.
ISSN:2190-8508
2190-8516
DOI:10.1007/s13389-018-00201-3