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Does a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good
We report the results of an experiment investigating the provision of a step-level collective good. This experiment compares the behavior of subjects in a public good game with the behavior of subjects in a club good game. In the club good game, players who do not contribute the membership fee are e...
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| Published in: | Public choice 2013-10, Vol.157 (1/2), p.25-39 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c502t-62387384d381c6e63a8d44d566b3126e0764a08fb78599d52ac522e653e621523 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c502t-62387384d381c6e63a8d44d566b3126e0764a08fb78599d52ac522e653e621523 |
| container_end_page | 39 |
| container_issue | 1/2 |
| container_start_page | 25 |
| container_title | Public choice |
| container_volume | 157 |
| creator | Bchir, Mohamed Ali Willinger, Marc |
| description | We report the results of an experiment investigating the provision of a step-level collective good. This experiment compares the behavior of subjects in a public good game with the behavior of subjects in a club good game. In the club good game, players who do not contribute the membership fee are excluded from the consumption of the collective good. The introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects: it increases the provision of the collective good, delays provision failures and increases the number of contributors. The experiment also reveals the limits of the introduction of a small fee. At a high threshold level, the membership fee no longer ensures successful provision. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11127-012-9929-9 |
| format | article |
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An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good</title><title>Public choice</title><addtitle>Public Choice</addtitle><description>We report the results of an experiment investigating the provision of a step-level collective good. This experiment compares the behavior of subjects in a public good game with the behavior of subjects in a club good game. In the club good game, players who do not contribute the membership fee are excluded from the consumption of the collective good. The introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects: it increases the provision of the collective good, delays provision failures and increases the number of contributors. The experiment also reveals the limits of the introduction of a small fee. At a high threshold level, the membership fee no longer ensures successful provision.</description><subject>Clubs</subject><subject>Consumption</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Endowments</subject><subject>Environmental Sciences</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Experiment design</subject><subject>Experimental methods</subject><subject>Experiments</subject><subject>Fees</subject><subject>Fees & charges</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Linear regression</subject><subject>Membership</subject><subject>Membership groups</subject><subject>Memberships</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Observed choices</subject><subject>Organizational behavior</subject><subject>Political Science</subject><subject>Psychological aspects</subject><subject>Public choice</subject><subject>Public Finance</subject><subject>Public good</subject><subject>Public Goods</subject><subject>Satellites</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Threshing</subject><subject>Token money</subject><issn>0048-5829</issn><issn>1573-7101</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><sourceid>ALSLI</sourceid><sourceid>DPSOV</sourceid><sourceid>HEHIP</sourceid><sourceid>M0C</sourceid><sourceid>M2L</sourceid><sourceid>M2R</sourceid><sourceid>M2S</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkU-r1DAUxYMoOI5-ABdCwI0uqvnTpMlKhqfvPWHAja5DJr2dyZBpatKW54fwO5taeYoLcRW4-Z2Te3IQek7JG0pI8zZTSllTEcoqrZmu9AO0oaLhVUMJfYg2hNSqEorpx-hJzmdCCJdKbND39xEytvgClwOkfPID7gBwF_MICefJOci5mwIepkPwDh9jbPGQ4uyzj_07vOsx3A2Q_AX60Qbs-xny6I92LNc4dng8wW9-GVhcrIcqwAwBuxgCuNHP8NP5KXrU2ZDh2a9zi75cf_h8dVvtP918vNrtKycIGyvJuGq4qluuqJMguVVtXbdCygOnTAJpZG2J6g6NElq3glknGAMpOEhGBeNb9Hr1PdlghrK8Td9MtN7c7vZmmREmCdGCzLSwr1a2pPg6lXDm4rODEGwPccqG1rqRQmnO_gPljRZKlM_fopd_oec4pb6EXqiaMkLl8jZdKZdizgm6-2UpMUvvZu3dlN7N0rvRRcNWTS5sf4T0h_M_RC9W0TmPMd2_UrOyKi3ZfgDYZrjV</recordid><startdate>20131001</startdate><enddate>20131001</enddate><creator>Bchir, Mohamed Ali</creator><creator>Willinger, Marc</creator><general>Springer</general><general>Springer US</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><general>Springer Verlag</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0-V</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88C</scope><scope>88J</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AEUYN</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ALSLI</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DPSOV</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>HEHIP</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K8~</scope><scope>KC-</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0T</scope><scope>M2L</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>M2R</scope><scope>M2S</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PHGZM</scope><scope>PHGZT</scope><scope>PJZUB</scope><scope>PKEHL</scope><scope>POGQB</scope><scope>PPXIY</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRQQA</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>1XC</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20131001</creationdate><title>Does a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good</title><author>Bchir, Mohamed Ali ; Willinger, Marc</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c502t-62387384d381c6e63a8d44d566b3126e0764a08fb78599d52ac522e653e621523</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Clubs</topic><topic>Consumption</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Endowments</topic><topic>Environmental Sciences</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Experiment design</topic><topic>Experimental methods</topic><topic>Experiments</topic><topic>Fees</topic><topic>Fees & charges</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Linear regression</topic><topic>Membership</topic><topic>Membership groups</topic><topic>Memberships</topic><topic>Nash equilibrium</topic><topic>Observed choices</topic><topic>Organizational 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An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good</atitle><jtitle>Public choice</jtitle><stitle>Public Choice</stitle><date>2013-10-01</date><risdate>2013</risdate><volume>157</volume><issue>1/2</issue><spage>25</spage><epage>39</epage><pages>25-39</pages><issn>0048-5829</issn><eissn>1573-7101</eissn><coden>PUCHBX</coden><abstract>We report the results of an experiment investigating the provision of a step-level collective good. This experiment compares the behavior of subjects in a public good game with the behavior of subjects in a club good game. In the club good game, players who do not contribute the membership fee are excluded from the consumption of the collective good. The introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects: it increases the provision of the collective good, delays provision failures and increases the number of contributors. The experiment also reveals the limits of the introduction of a small fee. At a high threshold level, the membership fee no longer ensures successful provision.</abstract><cop>Boston</cop><pub>Springer</pub><doi>10.1007/s11127-012-9929-9</doi><tpages>15</tpages></addata></record> |
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| subjects | Clubs Consumption Economics Economics and Finance Endowments Environmental Sciences Equilibrium Experiment design Experimental methods Experiments Fees Fees & charges Game theory Games Linear regression Membership Membership groups Memberships Nash equilibrium Observed choices Organizational behavior Political Science Psychological aspects Public choice Public Finance Public good Public Goods Satellites Studies Threshing Token money |
| title | Does a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good |
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