Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heteregeneous individuals

The authors study experimentally a coordination game with N heterogeneous individuals under different information treatments. They explore the effects of information on the emergence of Pareto-efficient outcomes, by means of a gradual decrease of the information content provided to the players in su...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Theory and decision 2010, Vol.69 (1), p.119-142
Main Authors: Semeshenko, Viktoriya, Garapin, Alexis, Ruffieux, Bernard, Gordon, Mirta B.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Humanities and Social Sciences
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The authors study experimentally a coordination game with N heterogeneous individuals under different information treatments. They explore the effects of information on the emergence of Pareto-efficient outcomes, by means of a gradual decrease of the information content provided to the players in successive experiments. They observe that successful coordination is possible with private information alone, although not on a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Reinforcement-based learning models reproduce the qualitative trends of the experimental results.
ISSN:0040-5833
1573-7187
DOI:10.1007/s11238-009-9161-3