One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastru...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:American economic journal. Applied economics 2017-10, Vol.9 (4), p.1-29
Main Authors: Do, Quoc-Anh, Nguyen, Kieu-Trang, Tran, Anh N.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authoritarianism
Bias
Communes
Economic theory
Economics and Finance
Employee promotions
Favoritism
Humanities and Social Sciences
Infrastructure
Legislators
Patronage
Political power
Politics
Public officials
Ratings & rankings
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Summary:We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown. (JEL D72, H76, O15, O17, O18, P25, Z13)
ISSN:1945-7782
1945-7790
DOI:10.1257/app.20130472