Network games with incomplete information

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a un...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of mathematical economics 2015-12, Vol.61, p.221-240
Main Authors: de Martí, Joan, Zenou, Yves
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency theory
Bayesian analysis
Bayesian games
Bayesian method
Correlation analysis
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Game theory
Humanities and Social Sciences
Social networks
Strategic complementarities
Studies
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities.
ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.002