Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

• Published in: Journal of public economics 2019-10, Vol.178, p.104065, Article 104065
• Main Authors: Bol, Damien, Matakos, Konstantinos, Troumpounis, Orestis, Xefteris, Dimitrios
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Disproportionality; Electoral systems; Humanities and Social Sciences; Laboratory experiment; Polarization; Political science; Proportional representation; Strategic entry
• ISSN: 0047-2727; 1879-2316
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104065

How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (i.e. the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory: An increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits: a) a first-order negative effect on platform polarization, b) a second-order negative effect on the number of parties (as polarization decreases, centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter), and c) an additional third-order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties. We then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model. •We build a model of electoral competition with endogenous entry and platform choice under alternative electoral rules.•We highlight potential channels through which electoral rules simultaneously affect the number of competing parties and polarization.•We provide experimental evidence in line with our theoretical predictions.