Covert D2D Communication Underlaying Cellular Network: A System-Level Security Perspective

• Published in: IEEE transactions on wireless communications 2024-08, Vol.23 (8), p.9518-9533
• Main Authors: Feng, Shaohan, Lu, Xiao, Zhu, Kun, Niyato, Dusit, Wang, Ping
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: cellular network; Cellular networks; Covert communication; D2D network; Device-to-device communication; Games; Geometry; Security; Stochastic processes; system-level optimization; Wireless networks
• ISSN: 1536-1276; 1558-2248
• DOI: 10.1109/TWC.2024.3363186

To meet the surging wireless traffic demand, underlaying cellular networks with device-to-device (D2D) communication to reuse the cellular spectrum has been envisioned as a promising solution. In this paper, we aim to secure the D2D communication of the D2D-underlaid cellular network by leveraging covert communication to hide its presence from the vigilant adversary. In particular, there are adversaries aiming to detect D2D communications according to their received signal powers. To avoid being detected, the legitimate entity, i.e., D2D-underlaid cellular network, performs power control aiming to hide the D2D communication. We model the conflict between the adversaries and the legitimate entity as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Therein, the adversaries are the followers intending to detect D2D communication at the lower stage while the legitimate entity is the leader and aims to maximize its utility constrained by the D2D communication covertness and the cellular quality of service (QoS) at the upper stage. Different from the conventional works, the study of the combat is conducted from the system-level perspective, where the scenario that a large-scale D2D-underlaid cellular network threatened by massive spatially distributed adversaries is considered and modeled by stochastic geometry. We obtain the adversary's optimal strategy as the best response from the lower stage and also both analytically and numerically verify its optimality. Taking into consideration the best response from the lower stage and based on the successive convex approximation (SCA) method, we devise a bi-level algorithm to find the optimal strategy of the legitimate entity, which together with the best response from the lower stage constitute the Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical results are presented to evaluate the network performance and reveal practical insights that instead of improving the legitimate utility by strengthening the D2D link reliability, increasing D2D transmission power will degrade it due to the security concern.