CoMeT: Count-Min-Sketch-based Row Tracking to Mitigate RowHammer at Low Cost

• Main Authors: Bostanci, F. Nisa, Yuksel, Ismail Emir, Olgun, Ataberk, Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos, Tugrul, Yahya Can, Yaglici, A. Giray, Sadrosadati, Mohammad, Mutlu, Onur
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Subjects: Comets; Computer architecture; Costs; DRAM chips; Energy efficiency; Hash functions; Random access memory
• ISSN: 2378-203X
• DOI: 10.1109/HPCA57654.2024.00050

DRAM chips are increasingly more vulnerable to read-disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing DRAM rows causes bitflips in nearby rows due to DRAM density scaling. Under low RowHammer thresholds, existing RowHammer mitigations either incur high area overheads or degrade performance significantly. We propose a new RowHammer mitigation mechanism, CoMeT, that prevents RowHammer bitflips with low area, performance, and energy costs in DRAM-based systems at very low RowHammer thresholds. The key idea of CoMeT is to use low-cost and scalable hash-based counters to track DRAM row activations. CoMeT uses the Count-Min Sketch technique that maps each DRAM row to a group of counters, as uniquely as possible, using multiple hash functions. When a DRAM row is activated, CoMeT increments the counters mapped to that DRAM row. Because the mapping from DRAM rows to counters is not completely unique, activating one row can increment one or more counters mapped to another row. Thus, CoMeT may overestimate, but never underestimates, a DRAM row's activation count. This property of CoMeT allows it to securely prevent RowHammer bitflips while properly configuring its hash functions reduces overestimations. As a result, CoMeT 1) implements substantially fewer counters (e.g., thousands of counters) than the number of DRAM rows in a DRAM bank (e.g., 128K rows) and 2) does not significantly overestimate a DRAM row's activation count. We demonstrate that CoMeT securely prevents RowHammer bitflips at low area, performance, and energy cost. Our comprehensive evaluations show that CoMeT prevents RowHammer bitflips with an average performance overhead of only 0.19% and 4.01 % across 61 benign single-core workloads for a RowHammer threshold of 1K and a very low RowHammer threshold of 125, respectively, normalized to a system with no RowHammer mitigation. CoMeT achieves a good trade-off between performance, energy, and area overheads. Compared to the best prior performance- and energy-efficient RowHammer mitigation mechanism, CoMeT requires 5.4x and 74.2x less area overhead at RowHammer thresholds of 1K and 125, respectively, and incurs a small (≤ 1.75%) performance overhead on average, for all RowHammer thresholds. Compared to the best prior low-area-cost mitigation mechanism, at a very low RowHammer threshold of 125, CoMeT improves performance by up to 39.1% while incurring a similar area overhead. CoMeT is openly and freely available at https://gi