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Unveiling SDN Controller Identity through Timing Side Channel
Software-defined networking (SDN) has revolutionized the landscape of network management by decoupling control and data planes and becoming the backbone of many IT infrastructures including data centers, cloud computing, and enterprise networks. At the same time, however, the control plane has becom...
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creator | Kyung, Sukwha Baek, Jaejong Ahn, Gail-Joon |
description | Software-defined networking (SDN) has revolutionized the landscape of network management by decoupling control and data planes and becoming the backbone of many IT infrastructures including data centers, cloud computing, and enterprise networks. At the same time, however, the control plane has become a prime target for adversaries due to its critical role in network operations and centralized control functions. In this paper, we demonstrate how to discover the identity of different SDN controllers, which could be leveraged for more sophisticated attacks by adversaries. Our approach adopts a timing-based side channel and deep neural networks (DNN). To achieve this, we analyze real-world SDN traffic in a research computing center and accurately identify the controllers, minimizing the impact of random noise. Despite various factors that influence controller behaviors, our fingerprinting approach achieves an average accuracy of more than 90%. Lastly, the mitigation strategies are also discussed. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1109/NoF62948.2024.10741434 |
format | conference_proceeding |
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At the same time, however, the control plane has become a prime target for adversaries due to its critical role in network operations and centralized control functions. In this paper, we demonstrate how to discover the identity of different SDN controllers, which could be leveraged for more sophisticated attacks by adversaries. Our approach adopts a timing-based side channel and deep neural networks (DNN). To achieve this, we analyze real-world SDN traffic in a research computing center and accurately identify the controllers, minimizing the impact of random noise. Despite various factors that influence controller behaviors, our fingerprinting approach achieves an average accuracy of more than 90%. Lastly, the mitigation strategies are also discussed.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2833-0072</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9798350377767</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/NoF62948.2024.10741434</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Accuracy ; Artificial neural networks ; Centralized control ; Cloud computing ; Data centers ; Fingerprint recognition ; Noise ; Prevention and mitigation ; Software defined networking ; Timing</subject><ispartof>International Conference on the Network of the Future (Online), 2024, p.169-177</ispartof><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741434$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,780,784,789,790,27925,54555,54932</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741434$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kyung, Sukwha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Baek, Jaejong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ahn, Gail-Joon</creatorcontrib><title>Unveiling SDN Controller Identity through Timing Side Channel</title><title>International Conference on the Network of the Future (Online)</title><addtitle>NoF</addtitle><description>Software-defined networking (SDN) has revolutionized the landscape of network management by decoupling control and data planes and becoming the backbone of many IT infrastructures including data centers, cloud computing, and enterprise networks. At the same time, however, the control plane has become a prime target for adversaries due to its critical role in network operations and centralized control functions. In this paper, we demonstrate how to discover the identity of different SDN controllers, which could be leveraged for more sophisticated attacks by adversaries. Our approach adopts a timing-based side channel and deep neural networks (DNN). To achieve this, we analyze real-world SDN traffic in a research computing center and accurately identify the controllers, minimizing the impact of random noise. Despite various factors that influence controller behaviors, our fingerprinting approach achieves an average accuracy of more than 90%. Lastly, the mitigation strategies are also discussed.</description><subject>Accuracy</subject><subject>Artificial neural networks</subject><subject>Centralized control</subject><subject>Cloud computing</subject><subject>Data centers</subject><subject>Fingerprint recognition</subject><subject>Noise</subject><subject>Prevention and mitigation</subject><subject>Software defined networking</subject><subject>Timing</subject><issn>2833-0072</issn><isbn>9798350377767</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><recordid>eNqFjr0KwjAYAKMgWLRvIJIXaP3yU9MOTtWiSxfrLAU_20hMJY1C314QnZ1uuBuOkCWDmDHIVmVXrHkm05gDlzEDJZkUckTCTGWpSEAopdZqTAKeChEBKD4lYd_fAEBwkEwkAdmc7Au10bahx21J88561xmDjh4uaL32A_Wt655NSyt9_2T6gjRva2vRzMnkWpsewy9nZFHsqnwfaUQ8P5y-1244_87EH_0GNgg7OA</recordid><startdate>20241002</startdate><enddate>20241002</enddate><creator>Kyung, Sukwha</creator><creator>Baek, Jaejong</creator><creator>Ahn, Gail-Joon</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IL</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIL</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20241002</creationdate><title>Unveiling SDN Controller Identity through Timing Side Channel</title><author>Kyung, Sukwha ; Baek, Jaejong ; Ahn, Gail-Joon</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-ieee_primary_107414343</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Accuracy</topic><topic>Artificial neural networks</topic><topic>Centralized control</topic><topic>Cloud computing</topic><topic>Data centers</topic><topic>Fingerprint recognition</topic><topic>Noise</topic><topic>Prevention and mitigation</topic><topic>Software defined networking</topic><topic>Timing</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kyung, Sukwha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Baek, Jaejong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ahn, Gail-Joon</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kyung, Sukwha</au><au>Baek, Jaejong</au><au>Ahn, Gail-Joon</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Unveiling SDN Controller Identity through Timing Side Channel</atitle><btitle>International Conference on the Network of the Future (Online)</btitle><stitle>NoF</stitle><date>2024-10-02</date><risdate>2024</risdate><spage>169</spage><epage>177</epage><pages>169-177</pages><eissn>2833-0072</eissn><eisbn>9798350377767</eisbn><abstract>Software-defined networking (SDN) has revolutionized the landscape of network management by decoupling control and data planes and becoming the backbone of many IT infrastructures including data centers, cloud computing, and enterprise networks. At the same time, however, the control plane has become a prime target for adversaries due to its critical role in network operations and centralized control functions. In this paper, we demonstrate how to discover the identity of different SDN controllers, which could be leveraged for more sophisticated attacks by adversaries. Our approach adopts a timing-based side channel and deep neural networks (DNN). To achieve this, we analyze real-world SDN traffic in a research computing center and accurately identify the controllers, minimizing the impact of random noise. Despite various factors that influence controller behaviors, our fingerprinting approach achieves an average accuracy of more than 90%. Lastly, the mitigation strategies are also discussed.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/NoF62948.2024.10741434</doi></addata></record> |
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ispartof | International Conference on the Network of the Future (Online), 2024, p.169-177 |
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language | eng |
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source | IEEE Xplore All Conference Series |
subjects | Accuracy Artificial neural networks Centralized control Cloud computing Data centers Fingerprint recognition Noise Prevention and mitigation Software defined networking Timing |
title | Unveiling SDN Controller Identity through Timing Side Channel |
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