Loading…
Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation
Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be m...
Saved in:
Published in: | IEEE journal of solid-state circuits 2024-12, p.1-12 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
cited_by | |
---|---|
cites | |
container_end_page | 12 |
container_issue | |
container_start_page | 1 |
container_title | IEEE journal of solid-state circuits |
container_volume | |
creator | He, Yan Su, Yumin Yang, Kaiyuan |
description | Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be mounted with little effort by tampering with clock signals and/or the chip's operating conditions. To mitigate such low-cost, yet powerful attacks, we propose a fully synthesizable and distributable in situ fault injection monitor that employs a delay locked loop (DLL) to track the pulsewidth of the clock. We further develop a fully automated design framework to optimize and implement the FIA monitors at any process node. Our design is fabricated and verified in 65-nm CMOS technology with a small footprint of 1500 \mu m ^2 . It can lock to clock frequencies from 2 MHz to 1.26 GHz while detecting all 12 types of possible clock glitches, as well as timing FIA injections via the supply voltage, electromagnetic (EM) signals, and chip temperature. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1109/JSSC.2024.3504546 |
format | article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>ieee</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_10777000</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>10777000</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>10777000</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i106t-cc9b769cbdabb439f3cc4a4a5beca5af3621e1c96cb02826cc497838620807a93</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotjL1OwzAYRT2ARCk8ABKDX8Dh808ce4zSlhYVMbSIBamyHSe4ahyUuANvT1CZjq7u0UHogUJGKeinl92uyhgwkfEcRC7kFZoBUEU0A7hBt-N4nKYQis7Q58KPoY2kbGM_puDwIoxpCPacfI33oQuxxStzPiW8iUfvUugjfu1jSP2AP0L6wstYk9STCfiSwuU59Z35M-_QdWNOo7__5xy9r5b7ak22b8-bqtySQEEm4py2hdTO1sZawXXDnRNGmNx6Z3LTcMmop05LZ4EpJqdXF4oryUBBYTSfo8dLN3jvD99D6Mzwc6BQFAUA8F8WNFFP</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation</title><source>IEEE Xplore (Online service)</source><creator>He, Yan ; Su, Yumin ; Yang, Kaiyuan</creator><creatorcontrib>He, Yan ; Su, Yumin ; Yang, Kaiyuan</creatorcontrib><description><![CDATA[Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be mounted with little effort by tampering with clock signals and/or the chip's operating conditions. To mitigate such low-cost, yet powerful attacks, we propose a fully synthesizable and distributable in situ fault injection monitor that employs a delay locked loop (DLL) to track the pulsewidth of the clock. We further develop a fully automated design framework to optimize and implement the FIA monitors at any process node. Our design is fabricated and verified in 65-nm CMOS technology with a small footprint of 1500 <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">\mu</tex-math> </inline-formula>m<inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">^2</tex-math> </inline-formula>. It can lock to clock frequencies from 2 MHz to 1.26 GHz while detecting all 12 types of possible clock glitches, as well as timing FIA injections via the supply voltage, electromagnetic (EM) signals, and chip temperature.]]></description><identifier>ISSN: 0018-9200</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/JSSC.2024.3504546</identifier><identifier>CODEN: IJSCBC</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Circuit faults ; Clocks ; Delay locked loop (DLL) ; Delays ; design automation ; fault injection attacks (FIAs) ; fault injection monitors ; hardware security ; Logic gates ; Monitoring ; Registers ; Sensors ; Temperature measurement ; Temperature sensors ; Voltage</subject><ispartof>IEEE journal of solid-state circuits, 2024-12, p.1-12</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><orcidid>yumin.su@rice.edu ; kyang@rice.edu</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10777000$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,54796</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>He, Yan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Su, Yumin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yang, Kaiyuan</creatorcontrib><title>Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation</title><title>IEEE journal of solid-state circuits</title><addtitle>JSSC</addtitle><description><![CDATA[Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be mounted with little effort by tampering with clock signals and/or the chip's operating conditions. To mitigate such low-cost, yet powerful attacks, we propose a fully synthesizable and distributable in situ fault injection monitor that employs a delay locked loop (DLL) to track the pulsewidth of the clock. We further develop a fully automated design framework to optimize and implement the FIA monitors at any process node. Our design is fabricated and verified in 65-nm CMOS technology with a small footprint of 1500 <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">\mu</tex-math> </inline-formula>m<inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">^2</tex-math> </inline-formula>. It can lock to clock frequencies from 2 MHz to 1.26 GHz while detecting all 12 types of possible clock glitches, as well as timing FIA injections via the supply voltage, electromagnetic (EM) signals, and chip temperature.]]></description><subject>Circuit faults</subject><subject>Clocks</subject><subject>Delay locked loop (DLL)</subject><subject>Delays</subject><subject>design automation</subject><subject>fault injection attacks (FIAs)</subject><subject>fault injection monitors</subject><subject>hardware security</subject><subject>Logic gates</subject><subject>Monitoring</subject><subject>Registers</subject><subject>Sensors</subject><subject>Temperature measurement</subject><subject>Temperature sensors</subject><subject>Voltage</subject><issn>0018-9200</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNotjL1OwzAYRT2ARCk8ABKDX8Dh808ce4zSlhYVMbSIBamyHSe4ahyUuANvT1CZjq7u0UHogUJGKeinl92uyhgwkfEcRC7kFZoBUEU0A7hBt-N4nKYQis7Q58KPoY2kbGM_puDwIoxpCPacfI33oQuxxStzPiW8iUfvUugjfu1jSP2AP0L6wstYk9STCfiSwuU59Z35M-_QdWNOo7__5xy9r5b7ak22b8-bqtySQEEm4py2hdTO1sZawXXDnRNGmNx6Z3LTcMmop05LZ4EpJqdXF4oryUBBYTSfo8dLN3jvD99D6Mzwc6BQFAUA8F8WNFFP</recordid><startdate>20241204</startdate><enddate>20241204</enddate><creator>He, Yan</creator><creator>Su, Yumin</creator><creator>Yang, Kaiyuan</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/yumin.su@rice.edu</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/kyang@rice.edu</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20241204</creationdate><title>Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation</title><author>He, Yan ; Su, Yumin ; Yang, Kaiyuan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i106t-cc9b769cbdabb439f3cc4a4a5beca5af3621e1c96cb02826cc497838620807a93</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><topic>Circuit faults</topic><topic>Clocks</topic><topic>Delay locked loop (DLL)</topic><topic>Delays</topic><topic>design automation</topic><topic>fault injection attacks (FIAs)</topic><topic>fault injection monitors</topic><topic>hardware security</topic><topic>Logic gates</topic><topic>Monitoring</topic><topic>Registers</topic><topic>Sensors</topic><topic>Temperature measurement</topic><topic>Temperature sensors</topic><topic>Voltage</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>He, Yan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Su, Yumin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yang, Kaiyuan</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998–Present</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore</collection><jtitle>IEEE journal of solid-state circuits</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>He, Yan</au><au>Su, Yumin</au><au>Yang, Kaiyuan</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation</atitle><jtitle>IEEE journal of solid-state circuits</jtitle><stitle>JSSC</stitle><date>2024-12-04</date><risdate>2024</risdate><spage>1</spage><epage>12</epage><pages>1-12</pages><issn>0018-9200</issn><coden>IJSCBC</coden><abstract><![CDATA[Fault injection attacks (FIAs) induce hardware failures in circuits and exploit these faults to compromise the security of the system. It has been demonstrated that FIAs can bypass system security mechanisms, cause faulty outputs, and gain access to secret information. Certain types of FIAs can be mounted with little effort by tampering with clock signals and/or the chip's operating conditions. To mitigate such low-cost, yet powerful attacks, we propose a fully synthesizable and distributable in situ fault injection monitor that employs a delay locked loop (DLL) to track the pulsewidth of the clock. We further develop a fully automated design framework to optimize and implement the FIA monitors at any process node. Our design is fabricated and verified in 65-nm CMOS technology with a small footprint of 1500 <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">\mu</tex-math> </inline-formula>m<inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">^2</tex-math> </inline-formula>. It can lock to clock frequencies from 2 MHz to 1.26 GHz while detecting all 12 types of possible clock glitches, as well as timing FIA injections via the supply voltage, electromagnetic (EM) signals, and chip temperature.]]></abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/JSSC.2024.3504546</doi><tpages>12</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/yumin.su@rice.edu</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/kyang@rice.edu</orcidid></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0018-9200 |
ispartof | IEEE journal of solid-state circuits, 2024-12, p.1-12 |
issn | 0018-9200 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_ieee_primary_10777000 |
source | IEEE Xplore (Online service) |
subjects | Circuit faults Clocks Delay locked loop (DLL) Delays design automation fault injection attacks (FIAs) fault injection monitors hardware security Logic gates Monitoring Registers Sensors Temperature measurement Temperature sensors Voltage |
title | Design-Agnostic Distributed Timing Fault Injection Monitor With End-to-End Design Automation |
url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-28T10%3A15%3A23IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-ieee&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Design-Agnostic%20Distributed%20Timing%20Fault%20Injection%20Monitor%20With%20End-to-End%20Design%20Automation&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20journal%20of%20solid-state%20circuits&rft.au=He,%20Yan&rft.date=2024-12-04&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=12&rft.pages=1-12&rft.issn=0018-9200&rft.coden=IJSCBC&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/JSSC.2024.3504546&rft_dat=%3Cieee%3E10777000%3C/ieee%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i106t-cc9b769cbdabb439f3cc4a4a5beca5af3621e1c96cb02826cc497838620807a93%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=10777000&rfr_iscdi=true |