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Collusion-resistant intentional de-synchronization for digital video fingerprinting

A powerful class of attacks in multimedia fingerprinting is known as collusion attacks, where a clique of colluders, each having a copy of the same multimedia content with different fingerprint, combine their copies to form a colluded copy. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure against collusio...

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Main Authors:	Yinian Mao, Mihcak, M.K.
Format:	Conference Proceeding
Language:	English
Subjects:	Bandwidth Counting circuits Data security Degradation Educational institutions Fingerprint recognition Internet Protection Redundancy Sampling methods
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creator	Yinian Mao Mihcak, M.K.
description	A powerful class of attacks in multimedia fingerprinting is known as collusion attacks, where a clique of colluders, each having a copy of the same multimedia content with different fingerprint, combine their copies to form a colluded copy. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure against collusion attacks for digital video: pseudo-random intentional de-synchronization techniques. Each user's copy of video is slightly pseudo-randomly changed (de-synchronized) in such a way that these changes will not be noticeable for an individual copy, but will be significant enough to produce perceptual artifacts when multiple copies are combined (e.g., via averaging, replacement attacks, etc.). To achieve this task, we propose several novel effective techniques, including constrained random temporal and spatial sampling. We discuss feasibility issues and limitations of video de-synchronization, and present several examples.
doi_str_mv	10.1109/ICIP.2005.1529731
format	conference_proceeding
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In this paper, we propose a countermeasure against collusion attacks for digital video: pseudo-random intentional de-synchronization techniques. Each user's copy of video is slightly pseudo-randomly changed (de-synchronized) in such a way that these changes will not be noticeable for an individual copy, but will be significant enough to produce perceptual artifacts when multiple copies are combined (e.g., via averaging, replacement attacks, etc.). To achieve this task, we propose several novel effective techniques, including constrained random temporal and spatial sampling. 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subjects	Bandwidth Counting circuits Data security Degradation Educational institutions Fingerprint recognition Internet Protection Redundancy Sampling methods
title	Collusion-resistant intentional de-synchronization for digital video fingerprinting
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