Stability analysis of power market with bounded rationality considering transmission network constraints

It is necessary for independent system operators to analyze whether power market leads to the stable equilibrium conditions while designing power exchanges and policies. This paper proposes the dynamic Cournot game model of power market with bounded rationality considering transmission network const...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zhengjun Liu, Hongming Yang, Mingyong Lai
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Differential equations
Educational institutions
Information analysis
Nash equilibrium
Power generation
Power markets
Power system analysis computing
Power system dynamics
Power system modeling
Stability analysis
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Summary:It is necessary for independent system operators to analyze whether power market leads to the stable equilibrium conditions while designing power exchanges and policies. This paper proposes the dynamic Cournot game model of power market with bounded rationality considering transmission network constrains to accurately model the game behaviors of market participants. With this model, the Nash equilibrium of power market and its stability are quantitatively analyzed, from which it can be seen that power market has different Nash equilibrium and even does not have the Nash equilibrium in the different market parameters and the corresponding different operating conditions of transmission network, i.e., congestion and non-congestion, and the smooth adjustment of generation quantities and the restriction of the maximum value of electricity price can reinforce the stability of power market
ISSN:1548-3746
1558-3899
DOI:10.1109/MWSCAS.2005.1594133